Robert S. Hamada, American Finance Association, Report of the AFA Representative to the National Bureau of Economic Research, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings Fifty-Fifth Annual Meeting, American Finance, Association, Washington, D.C., January 6-8, 1995 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1025-1027

Recent studies using aging analysis have found high rates of default for rated, nonconvertible high‐yield bonds. This paper examines the remainder of the market and concludes that rated and nonrated convertible high‐yield bonds had significantly lower default rates. It also provides some evidence that nonrated, nonconvertible securities may have lower default rates. Even after controlling for issue size and coupon rates in a logit model, these differences remain statistically significant.

Recent studies using aging analysis have found high rates of default for rated, nonconvertible high-yield bonds. This paper examines the remainder of the market and concludes that rated and nonrated convertible high-yield bonds had significantly lower default rates. It also provides some evidence that nonrated, nonconvertible securities may have lower default rates. Even after controlling for issue size and coupon rates in a logit model, these differences remain statistically significant.

Recent studies using aging analysis have found high rates of default for rated, nonconvertible high-yield bonds. This paper examines the remainder of the market and concludes that rated. and nonrated convertible high-yield bonds had significantly lower defaul t rates. It also provides some evidence that nonrated, nonconvertible securities may have lower default rates. Even after controlling for issue size and coupon rates in a logit model, these differences rema in statistically significant.

Compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems. Theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance. Employees fund a large proportion of their firm's activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company. These arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons, to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders. Moreover, tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times. Currently, both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements. Prior to the 1980s, however, tax rules favored funding in other than company stock, implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period.