The development of organized markets for speculative-grade corporate debt has provided financial researchers with an opportunity to examine the pricing of default risk. By incorporating previous work on the default experience of low-rated corporate debt, this paper presents an introduction to risk-neutral models of risky-bond pricing and uses these to examine the relationship between the default premium embodied in bond yields and actual default rates. The contribution of macroeconomic information to the default premium is also examined. The author finds that holders of low-grade bonds have, on average, been compensated for losses due to default.

The development of organized markets for speculative‐grade corporate debt has provided financial researchers with an opportunity to examine the pricing of default risk. By incorporating previous work on the default experience of low‐rated corporate debt, this paper presents an introduction to risk‐neutral models of risky‐bond pricing and uses these to examine the relationship between the default premium embodied in bond yields and actual default rates. The contribution of macroeconomic information to the default premium is also examined. The author finds that holders of low‐grade bonds have, on average, been compensated for losses due to default.

This paper characterizes the function relating the number of new shares issued by a firm to the resulting change in the firm's stock price, when insiders are asymmetrically informed. We show that, in equilibrium, the stock price will be a decreasing function of the issue size; moreover, the rate of decrease can be so rapid to cause “equity rationing.” We also show that there will be underinvestment relative to the symmetric information case.

Albert S. Kyle, The Pricing of Oil and Gas: Some Further Results: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 1018-1020

An examination of the provisions of bond issues reveals that most bonds prohibit firms from calling the issue during the initial years, after which time the bond can be called at the option of the firm. A substantial number of firms, however, also reserve the right to call the issue during this initial period for purposes other than refinancing at a lower coupon rate. The additional flexibility which accompanies the option of early redemption can be used to reduce the agency costs of debt associated with future investment opportunities, informational asymmetry, and the risk incentive problem. Using a sample of newly issued bonds, statistical tests are performed to show that there are, in fact, differences between firms which do and do not reserve the right of early redemption. This paper shows that these differences provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms use the option of early redemption to reduce agency costs.