We offer the first empirical evidence on the adverse effect of credit default swap (CDS) coverage on subprime mortgage defaults. Using a large database of privately securitized mortgages, we find that higher defaults concentrate in mortgage pools with concurrent CDS coverage, and within these pools the loans originated after or shortly before the start of CDS coverage have an even higher delinquency rate. The results are robust across zip code and origination quarter cohorts. Overall, we show that CDS coverage helped drive higher mortgage defaults during the financial crisis

This study analyzes the motivations for and consequences of funds' credit default swap (CDS) investments using mutual funds' quarterly holdings from pre‐ to postfinancial crisis. Funds invest in CDS when facing unpredictable liquidity needs. Funds sell more in reference entities when the CDS is liquid relative to the underlying bonds and buy more when the CDS‐bond basis is more negative. To enhance yield, funds engage in negative basis trading and sell CDS with the highest spreads within rating categories, and with spreads higher than those of their bond portfolios. Funds with superior portfolio returns also demonstrate more skill in CDS trading

We derive an equilibrium asset pricing model incorporating liquidity risk, derivative assets, and short-selling due to hedging of non-traded risk. We show that, both for positive-net-supply assets and derivatives, the sign of liquidity effects depends on investor heterogeneity in non-traded risk exposure, risk aversion, horizon and wealth. We also show that liquidity risk affects derivatives in a different way than positive-net-supply assets. We estimate this model for the credit default swap market using GMM. We find strong evidence for an expected liquidity premium earned by the credit protection seller. The effect of liquidity risk is significant but economically small

We test the theoretical equivalence of credit default swap (CDS) prices and credit spreads derived by Duffie (1999) , finding support for the parity relation as an equilibrium condition. We also find two forms of deviation from parity. First, for three firms, CDS prices are substantially higher than credit spreads for long periods of time, arising from combinations of imperfections in the contract specification of CDSs and measurement errors in computing the credit spread. Second, we find short‐lived deviations from parity for all other companies due to a lead for CDS prices over credit spreads in the price discovery process

We investigate whether a model with time‐varying probability of economic disaster can explain prices of collateralized debt obligations. We focus on senior tranches of the CDX, an index of credit default swaps on investment grade firms. These assets do not incur losses until a large fraction of previously stable firms default, and thus are deep out‐of‐the money put options on the overall economy. When calibrated to consumption data and to the equity premium, the model explains the spreads on CDX tranches prior to and during the 2008 to 2009 crisis

Using proprietary credit default swap (CDS) data, I investigate how capital shocks at protection sellers impact pricing in the CDS market. Seller capital shocks—measured as CDS portfolio margin payments—account for 12% of the time‐series variation in weekly spread changes, a significant amount given that standard credit factors account for 18% during my sample. In addition, seller shocks possess information for spreads that is independent of institution‐wide measures of constraints. These findings imply a high degree of market segmentation, and suggest that frictions within specialized financial institutions prevent capital from flowing into the market at shorter horizons

This paper examines the pricing of municipal bonds. I use three distinct, complementary approaches to decompose municipal bond spreads into default and liquidity components, and find that default risk accounts for 74% to 84% of the average spread after adjusting for tax‐exempt status. The first approach estimates the liquidity component using transaction data, the second measures the default component with credit default swap data, and the third is a quasi‐natural experiment that estimates changes in default risk around pre‐refunding events. The price of default risk is high given the rare incidence of municipal default and implies a high risk premium

We study the design of credit default swaps (CDS) auctions, which determine the payments by CDS sellers to CDS buyers following defaults of bonds. Using a simple model, we find that the current design of CDS auctions leads to biased prices and inefficient allocations. This is because various restrictions imposed in CDS auctions prevent certain investors from participating in the price discovery and allocation process. The imposition of a price cap or floor also gives dealers large influence on the final auction price. We propose an alternative double auction design that delivers more efficient price discovery and allocations

We use novel data from a leading online job search platform to examine the impact of corporate distress on firms’ ability to attract job applicants. Survey responses suggest that job seekers accurately perceive firms’ financial condition, as measured by companies’ credit default swap prices and accounting data. Analyzing responses to job postings by major financial firms during the Great Recession, we find that an increase in an employer's distress results in fewer and lower quality applicants. These effects are particularly evident when the social safety net provides workers with weak protection against unemployment and for positions requiring a college education

Using five‐year credit default swap (CDS) spreads on 2,364 companies in 54 countries from 2004 to 2011, we find that firms exposed to stronger property rights through their foreign asset positions (institutional channel) and firms cross‐listed on exchanges with stricter disclosure requirements (informational channel) reduce their CDS spreads by 40 bps for a one‐standard‐deviation increase in their exposure to the two channels. These channels capture effects beyond those associated with firm‐ and country‐level fundamentals. Overall, we find that firm‐level global asset and information connections are important mechanisms to delink firms from their sovereign and country risks