ABSTRACT This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.

ABSTRACT Diversified firms have different values from comparable portfolios of single‐segment firms. These value differences must be due to differences in either future cash flows or future returns. Expected security returns on diversified firms vary systematically with relative value. Discount firms have significantly higher subsequent returns than premium firms. Slightly more than half of the cross‐sectional variation in excess values is due to variation in expected future cash flows, with the remainder due to variation in expected future returns and to covariation between cash flows and returns.

ABSTRACT Stocks and other financial assets are traded at prices that lie on a fixed grid determined by the minimum tick size. Observed prices and quoted spreads do not correspond to the equilibrium prices and true spreads that would exist in a market with no minimum tick size. Using Monte Carlo Markov Chain methods, this paper estimates the equilibrium prices and true spreads. For large stocks, most of the quoted spread is attributable to the rounding of prices and the adverse selection component is small. The true spread and the adverse selection component are greater for mid‐sized stocks.

Existing studies of mutual fund market timing analyze monthly returns and find little evidence of timing ability. We show that daily tests are more powerful and that mutual funds exhibit significant timing ability more often in daily tests than in monthly tests. We construct a set of synthetic fund returns in order to control for spurious results. The daily timing coefficients of the majority of funds are significantly different from their synthetic counterparts. These results suggest that mutual funds may possess more timing ability than previously documented.

ABSTRACT Motivated by recent financial crises in East Asia and the United States where the downfall of a small number of firms had an economy‐wide impact, this paper generalizes existing reduced‐form models to include default intensities dependent on the default of a counterparty. In this model, firms have correlated defaults due not only to an exposure to common risk factors, but also to firm‐specific risks that are termed “counterparty risks.” Numerical examples illustrate the effect of counterparty risk on the pricing of defaultable bonds and credit derivatives such as default swaps.

ABSTRACT We propose regression‐based tests for mean‐variance spanning in the case where investors face market frictions such as short sales constraints and transaction costs. We test whether U.S. investors can extend their efficient set by investing in emerging markets when accounting for such frictions. For the period after the major liberalizations in the emerging markets, we find strong evidence for diversification benefits when market frictions are excluded, but this evidence disappears when investors face short sales constraints or small transaction costs. Although simulations suggest that there is a possible small‐sample bias, this bias appears to be too small to affect our conclusions.

ABSTRACT Although traded as distinct products, caps and swaptions are linked by no‐arbitrage relations through the correlation structure of interest rates. Using a string market model, we solve for the correlation matrix implied by swaptions and examine the relative valuation of caps and swaptions. We find that swaption prices are generated by four factors and that implied correlations are lower than historical correlations. Long‐dated swaptions appear mispriced and there were major pricing distortions during the 1998 hedge‐fund crisis. Cap prices periodically deviate significantly from the no‐arbitrage values implied by the swaptions market.