ABSTRACT We develop and test a theory explaining the equilibrium matching of issuers and underwriters. We assume that issuers and underwriters associate by mutual choice, and that underwriter ability and issuer quality are complementary. Our model implies that matching is positive assortative, and that matches are based on firms' and underwriters' relative characteristics at the time of issuance. The model predicts that the market share of top underwriters and their average issue quality varies inversely with issuance volume. Various cross‐sectional patterns in underwriting spreads are consistent with equilibrium matching. We find strong empirical confirmation of our theory.

ABSTRACT We use the information in credit default swaps to obtain direct measures of the size of the default and nondefault components in corporate spreads. We find that the majority of the corporate spread is due to default risk. This result holds for all rating categories and is robust to the definition of the riskless curve. We also find that the nondefault component is time varying and strongly related to measures of bond‐specific illiquidity as well as to macroeconomic measures of bond market liquidity.

ABSTRACT A commonly held view in corporate finance is that firms are less leveraged than they should be, given the potentially large tax benefits of debt. In this paper, I study the effect of firms' leverage on default probabilities as represented by the firms' ratings. Using an instrumental variable approach, I find that the leverage's effect on ratings is three times stronger than it is if the endogeneity of leverage is ignored. This stronger effect results in a higher impact of leverage on the ex ante costs of financial distress, which can offset the current estimates of the tax benefits of debt.

ABSTRACT We decompose currency returns into (permanent) intrinsic‐value shocks and (transitory) expected‐return shocks. We explore interactions between these shocks, currency returns, and institutional‐investor currency flows. Intrinsic‐value shocks are: dwarfed by expected‐return shocks (yet currency returns overreact to them); unrelated to flows (although expected‐return shocks correlate with flows); and related positively to forecasted cumulated‐interest differentials. These results suggest flows are related to short‐term currency returns, while fundamentals better explain long‐term returns and values. They also rationalize the long‐observed poor performance of exchange‐rate models: by ignoring the distinction between permanent and transitory exchange‐rate changes, prior tests obscure the connection between currencies and fundamentals.

ABSTRACT We analyze intercorporate asset sales where equity is the means of payment, and compare the results to cash asset sales. Equity deals are value‐enhancing for both buyers, 10%, and sellers, 3%, while cash sales generate seller returns of 1.9% and buyer returns that are not significant. Combined wealth gains are large for equity deals, but modest for cash deals. Equity‐based asset sales are not a precursor to consolidations between buyers and sellers, and do not affect buyer openness to the takeover market. We conclude that the use of buyer equity conveys favorable information about the value of assets and buyers.

ABSTRACT We examine syndicates for 1,638 IPOs from January 1997 through June 2002. We find strong evidence of information production by syndicate members. Offer prices are more likely to be revised in response to information when the syndicate has more underwriters and especially more co‐managers. More co‐managers also result in more analyst coverage and additional market makers following the IPO. Relationships between underwriters are critical in determining the composition of syndicates, perhaps because they mitigate free‐riding and moral hazard problems. While there appear to be benefits to larger syndicates, we discuss several factors that may limit syndicate size.

ABSTRACT We solve the portfolio problem of a long‐run investor when the term structure is Gaussian and when the investor has access to nominal bonds and stock. We apply our method to a three‐factor model that captures the failure of the expectations hypothesis. We extend this model to account for time‐varying expected inflation, and estimate the model with both inflation and term structure data. The estimates imply that the bond portfolio of a long‐run investor looks very different from the portfolio of a mean‐variance optimizer. In particular, time‐varying term premia generate large hedging demands for long‐term bonds.

ABSTRACT Two behavioral concepts, loss aversion and mental accounting, have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle. Recent experimental evidence supports the theory, as students' behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion (MLA). Yet, much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision‐making, these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals. Using traders recruited from the CBOT, we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students, but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted, we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with MLA to a greater extent than students.

ABSTRACT We model a dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game with rational traders. Since the model is analytically intractable, we provide an algorithm based on Pakes and McGuire (2001) to find a stationary Markov‐perfect equilibrium. We then generate artificial time series and perform comparative dynamics. Conditional on a transaction, the midpoint of the quoted prices is not a good proxy for the true value. Further, transaction costs paid by market order submitters are negative on average, and negatively correlated with the effective spread. Reducing the tick size is not Pareto improving but increases total investor surplus.

ABSTRACT We develop a dynamic trade‐off model with endogenous choice of leverage, distributions, and real investment in the presence of a graduated corporate income tax, individual taxes on interest and corporate distributions, financial distress costs, and equity flotation costs. We explain several empirical findings inconsistent with the static trade‐off theory. We show there is no target leverage ratio, firms can be savers or heavily levered, leverage is path dependent, leverage is decreasing in lagged liquidity, and leverage varies negatively with an external finance weighted average Q . Using estimates of structural parameters, we find that simulated model moments match data moments.