This paper characterizes U.S. consumption dynamics from the perspective of a Bayesian agent who does not know the underlying model structure but learns over time from macroeconomic data. Realistic, high‐dimensional macroeconomic learning problems, which entail parameter, model, and state learning, generate substantially different subjective beliefs about consumption dynamics compared to the standard, full‐information rational expectations benchmark. Beliefs about long‐run dynamics are volatile, with counter‐cyclical conditional volatility, and drift over time. Embedding these beliefs in a standard asset pricing model significantly improves the model's ability to match the stylized facts, as well as the sample path of the market price‐dividend ratio.

The risk and return trade‐off, the cornerstone of modern asset pricing theory, is often of the wrong sign. Our explanation is that high‐beta assets are prone to speculative overpricing. When investors disagree about the stock market's prospects, high‐beta assets are more sensitive to this aggregate disagreement, experience greater divergence of opinion about their payoffs, and are overpriced due to short‐sales constraints. When aggregate disagreement is low, the Security Market Line is upward‐sloping due to risk‐sharing. When it is high, expected returns can actually decrease with beta. We confirm our theory using a measure of disagreement about stock market earnings.

We use novel data from a leading online job search platform to examine the impact of corporate distress on firms’ ability to attract job applicants. Survey responses suggest that job seekers accurately perceive firms’ financial condition, as measured by companies’ credit default swap prices and accounting data. Analyzing responses to job postings by major financial firms during the Great Recession, we find that an increase in an employer's distress results in fewer and lower quality applicants. These effects are particularly evident when the social safety net provides workers with weak protection against unemployment and for positions requiring a college education.

We identify retail brokers that seemingly route orders to maximize order flow payments, by selling market orders and sending limit orders to venues paying large liquidity rebates. Angel, Harris, and Spatt argue that such routing may not always be in customers’ best interests. For both proprietary limit order data and a broad sample of trades from TAQ, we document a negative relation between several measures of limit order execution quality and rebate/fee level. This finding suggests that order routing designed to maximize liquidity rebates does not maximize limit order execution quality and thus brokers cannot have it all.

We propose a model in which investors may choose to acquire costly information that identifies good assets and purchase these assets in opaque (OTC) markets. Uninformed investors access an asset pool that has been cream‐skimmed by informed investors. When the quality composition of assets for sale is fixed, there is too much information acquisition and the financial industry extracts excessive rents. In the presence of moral hazard in origination, the social value of information varies inversely with information acquisition. Low quality origination is associated with large rents in the financial sector. Equilibrium acquisition of information is generically inefficient.

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.

Using individual patient records for every hospital in California from 1983 to 2011, we find a strong inverse link between daily stock returns and hospital admissions, particularly for psychological conditions such as anxiety, panic disorder, and major depression. The effect is nearly instantaneous (within the same day) for psychological conditions, suggesting that anticipation over future consumption directly influences instantaneous utility.

Asset prices contain information about the probability distribution of future states and the stochastic discounting of those states as used by investors. To better understand the challenge in distinguishing investors' beliefs from risk‐adjusted discounting, we use Perron–Frobenius Theory to isolate a positive martingale component of the stochastic discount factor process. This component recovers a probability measure that absorbs long‐term risk adjustments. When the martingale is not degenerate, surmising that this recovered probability captures investors' beliefs distorts inference about risk‐return tradeoffs. Stochastic discount factors in many structural models of asset prices have empirically relevant martingale components.

We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories, we document widespread behind‐the‐scenes intervention as well as governance‐motivated exit. These governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit. We further find that long‐term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.