Intraday interest rates are zero. Consequently, a foreign exchange dealer can short a vulnerable currency in the morning, close this position in the afternoon, and never face an interest cost. This tactic might seem especially attractive in times of fixed-rate crisis, since it suggests an immunity to the central bank's interest rate defense. In equilibrium, however, buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as no devaluation occurs. That is, currencies under attack should typically appreciate intraday. Using data on intraday exchange rate changes within the European Monetary System, we find this prediction is borne out.

Univariate time‐series models for consumption, nominal interest rates, and prices each appear to have a single unit root before 1979. If nominal interest rates have a unit root but inflation and inflation forecast errors do not, then ex ante real interest rates have a unit root and are therefore nonstationary. This deduction does not depend on the properties of the unobservable ex post observed real return, which combines the ex ante real interest rate and inflation‐forecasting errors. The unit‐root characteristic of real interest rates is puzzling from at least two perspectives: many models imply that the growth rate of consumption and the real interest rate should have similar time‐series characteristics; also, nominal returns for other assets (e.g., stocks and bonds) appear to have different times‐series properties from those of treasury bills.

We examine large public interventions in the financial sector, such as bank nationalizations and search for “financial protectionism,” a decrease in the quantity and/or an increase in the price of loans that banks from one country make to borrowers resident in another. We use a bank‐level panel data set spanning all U.K.‐resident banks between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. After nationalization, foreign banks reduced their fraction of British loans by about 11% and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. In contrast, nationalized British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates.

Intraday interest rates are zero. Consequently, a foreign exchange dealer can short a vulnerable currency in the morning, close this position in the afternoon, and never face an interest cost. This tactic might seem especially attractive in times of fixed‐rate crisis, since it suggests an immunity to the central bank's interest rate defense. In equilibrium, however, buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as no devaluation occurs. That is, currencies under attack should typically appreciate intraday. Using data on intraday exchange rate changes within the European Monetary System, we find this prediction is borne out.

Intraday interest rates are zero.Consequently, a foreign exchange dealer can short a vulnerable currency in the morning, close this position in the afternoon, and never face an interest cost.This tactic might seem especially attractive in times of crisis, since it suggests an immunity to the central bank's interest rate defense.In equilibrium, however, buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as no devaluation occurs.That is, currencies under attack should typically appreciate intraday.Using data on intraday exchange rate changes within the EMS, we find this prediction is borne out.