ABSTRACT I develop a dynamic model of leverage with tax deductible interest and an endogenous cost of default. The interest rate includes a premium to compensate lenders for expected losses in default. A borrowing constraint is generated by lenders' unwillingness to lend an amount that would trigger immediate default. When the borrowing constraint is not binding, the trade‐off theory of debt holds: optimal debt equates the marginal interest tax shield and the marginal expected cost of default. Contrary to conventional interpretation, but consistent with empirical findings, increases in current or future profitability reduce the optimal leverage ratio when the trade‐off theory holds.

In this paper we analyze the theoretical implications of sorting data into groups and then running asset pricing tests within each group. We show that the way this procedure is implemented introduces a bias in favor of rejecting the model under consideration. By simply picking enough groups to sort into, the true asset pricing model can be shown to have no explanatory power within each group.

This article presents the first application in finance of recently developed methods for the Gaussian estimation of continuous time dynamic models. A range of one factor continuous time models of the short-term interest rate are estimated using a discrete time model and compared to a recent discrete approximation used by K. C. Chan, et al. (1992). Whereas the volatility of short-term rates is highly sensitive to the level of rates in the United States, it is not in the United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT This article presents the first application in finance of recently developed methods for the Gaussian estimation of continuous time dynamic models. A range of one factor continuous time models of the short‐term interest rate are estimated using a discrete time model and compared to a recent discrete approximation used by Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992a, hereafter CKLS). Whereas the volatility of short‐term rates is highly sensitive to the level of rates in the United States, it is not in the United Kingdom.

This article presents the first application in finance of recently developed methods for the Gaussian estimation of continuous time dynamic models. A range of one factor continuous time models of the short-term interest rate are estimated using a discrete time model and compared to a recent discrete approximation used by Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992a, hereafter CKLS). Whereas the volatility of short-term rates is highly sensitive to the level of rates in the United States, it is not in the United Kingdom.

While the U.S. has pursued a vigorous antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers over the past four decades, mergers in Canada have until recently been permitted to take place in a virtually unrestricted antitrust environment. The absence of an antitrust overhang in Canada presents an interesting opportunity to test the conjecture that the rigid market share and concentration criteria of the U.S. policy effectively deters a significant number of potentially collusive mergers. The effective deterrence hypothesis implies that the probability of a horizontal merger being anticompetitive is higher in Canada than in the U.S. However, parameters in cross-sectional regressions reject the market power hypothesis on samples of both U.S. and Canadian mergers. Judging from the Canadian evidence, there simply isn't much to deter.

Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals.

ABSTRACT Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals.

Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals.