This paper explores stock price behavior surrounding withdrawn buyout proposals to determine whether managers' proposal announcements reveal any information that is unrelated to the efficiency gains associated with completed buyouts. On average, firms whose managers withdraw buyout proposals do not sustain significantly positive stock price effects unless they receive subsequent acquisition bids. In addition, managers of firms with completed buyouts are no more likely to have access to inside information than managers who withdrew proposals. The author interprets this evidence as inconsistent with the notion that inside information commonly motivates management buyout proposals.

The author examines the structure of corporate ownership in a sample of Japanese firms in the mid 1980s. Ownership is highly concentrated in Japan, with financial institutions by far the most important large shareholders. Ownership concentration in independent Japanese firms is positively related to the returns from exerting greater control over management. This is not the case in firms that are members of corporate groups (keiretsu). Ownership concentration and the accounting profit rate in both independent and keiretsu firms are unrelated. The results are consistent with the notion that there exist two distinct corporate governance systems in Japan–one among independent firms and the other among firms that are members of keiretsu.

This paper explores stock price behavior surrounding withdrawn buyout proposals to determine whether managers' proposal announcements reveal any information which is unrelated to the efficiency gains associated with completed buyouts. On average, firms whose managers withdraw buyout proposals do not sustain significantly positive stock price effects unless they receive subsequent acquisition bids. In addition, managers of firms with completed buyouts are no more likely to have access to inside information than managers who withdrew proposals. I interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the notion that inside information commonly motivates management buyout proposals.

I examine the structure of corporate ownership in a sample of Japanese firms in the mid 1980s. Ownership is highly concentrated in Japan, with financial institutions by far the most important large shareholders. Ownership concentration in independent Japanese firms is positively related to the returns from exerting greater control over management. This is not the case in firms that are members of corporate groups (keiretsu). Ownership concentration and the accounting profit rate in both independent and keiretsu firms are unrelated. The results are consistent with the notion that there exist two distinct corporate governance systems in Japan —one among independent firms and the other among firms that are members of keiretsu.

I examine the structure of corporate ownership in a sample of Japanese firms in the mid 1980s. Ownership is highly concentrated in Japan, with financial institutions by far the most important large shareholders. Ownership concentration in independent Japanese firms is positively related to the returns from exerting greater control over management. This is not the case in firms that are members of corporate groups (keiretsu). Ownership concentration and the accounting profit rate in both independent and keiretsu firms are unrelated. The results are consistent with the notion that there exist two distinct corporate governance systems in Japan —one among independent firms and the other among firms that are members of keiretsu.

M. Grinblatt and S. Titman (1985) reformulate a result of G. Chamberlain and M. Rothschild (1983) to show that the approximate factor structure of Chamberlain and Rothschild is asymptotically equivalent to the strict factor structure of S. A. Ross (1976) as long as investors can always repackage securities into an equal number of arbitrary portfolios. This paper uses a Procrustes rotation methodology that is compatible with the repackaging interpretation of Grinblatt and Titman to show that the empirical structure of stock prices is consistent with the convergency hypothesis.

The January effect is primarily a low-share price effect and less so a market value effect. In the recent 1977-86 period, after-transaction-cost raw and excess January returns are lower on low-price stocks than on high-price stocks. Failure of informed traders to eliminate significantly large before-transaction-cost excess January returns on low-price stocks is potentially explained by higher transactions costs and a bid-ask bias. At the least, the January anomaly found in prior tests is not persistent and, thereby, not likely to be exploitable by typical investors.

The January effect is primarily a low‐share price effect and less so a market value effect. In the recent 1977–1986 period, after‐transaction‐cost raw and excess January returns are lower on low‐price stocks than on high‐price stocks. Failure of informed traders to eliminate significantly large before‐transaction‐cost excess January returns on low‐price stocks is potentially explained by higher transaction costs and a bid‐ask bias. At the least, the January anomaly found in prior tests is not persistent, and thereby, not likely to be exploitable by typical investors.