This article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements. A repo rate is, in effect, an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument. A 'special' is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates. This article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited, whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs, from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements. Specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials.

This article presents a model for valuing claims subject to default by both contracting parties, such as swaps and forwards. With counterparties of different default risk, the promised cash flows of a swap are discounted by a switching discount rate that, at any given state and time, is equal to the discount rate of the counterparty for whom the swap is currently out of the money (that is, a liability). The impact of credit-risk asymmetry and of netting is presented through both theory and numerical examples, which include interest rate and currency swaps.

This article develops a multi-factor econometric model of the term structure of interest-rate swap yields. The model accommodates the possibility of counterparty default, and any differences in the liquidities of the Treasury and Swap markets. By parameterizing a model of swap rates directly, the authors are able to compute model-based estimates of the defaultable zero-coupon bond rates implicit in the swap market without having to specify a priori the dependence of these rates on default hazard or recovery rates. The time series analysis of spreads between zero-coupon swap and treasury yields reveals that both credit and liquidity factors were important sources of variation in swap spreads over the past decade.

I describe asset price dynamics caused by the slow movement of investment capital to trading opportunities. The pattern of price responses to supply or demand shocks typically involves a sharp reaction to the shock and a subsequent and more extended reversal. The amplitude of the immediate price impact and the pattern of the subsequent recovery can reflect institutional impediments to immediate trade, such as search costs for trading counterparties or time to raise capital by intermediaries. I discuss special impediments to capital formation during the recent financial crisis that caused asset price distortions, which subsided afterward. After presenting examples of price reactions to supply shocks in normal market settings, I offer a simple illustrative model of price dynamics associated with slow‐moving capital due to the presence of inattentive investors.

This article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements. A repo rate is, in effect, an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument. A “special” is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates. This article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited, whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs, from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements. Specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials.

This article provides the causes and symptoms of special repo rates in a competitive market for repurchase agreements. A repo rate is, in effect, an interest rate on loans collateralized by a specific instrument. A “special” is a repo rate significantly below prevailing market riskless interest rates. This article shows that specials can occur when those owning the collateral are inhibited, whether from legal or institutional requirements or from frictional costs, from supplying collateral into repurchase agreements. Specialness increases the equilibrium price for the underlying instrument by the present value of savings in borrowing costs associated with the repo specials.

The probability of extreme default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt is much greater than would be estimated under the standard assumption that default correlation arises only from exposure to observable risk factors. At the high confidence levels at which bank loan portfolio and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) default losses are typically measured for economic capital and rating purposes, conventionally based loss estimates are downward biased by a full order of magnitude on test portfolios. Our estimates are based on U.S. public nonfinancial firms between 1979 and 2004. We find strong evidence for the presence of common latent factors, even when controlling for observable factors that provide the most accurate available model of firm-by-firm default probabilities.

This article presents a model for valuing claims subject to default by both contracting parties, such as swaps and forwards. With counterparties of different default risk, the promised cash flows of a swap are discounted by a switching discount rate that, at any given state and time, is equal to the discount rate of the counterparty for whom the swap is currently out of the money (that is, a liability). The impact of credit‐risk asymmetry and of netting is presented through both theory and numerical examples, which include interest rate and currency swaps.

This article develops a multi‐factor econometric model of the term structure of interest‐rate swap yields. The model accommodates the possibility of counterparty default, and any differences in the liquidities of the Treasury and Swap markets. By parameterizing a model of swap rates directly, we are able to compute model‐based estimates of the defaultable zero‐coupon bond rates implicit in the swap market without having to specify a priori the dependence of these rates on default hazard or recovery rates. The time series analysis of spreads between zero‐coupon swap and treasury yields reveals that both credit and liquidity factors were important sources of variation in swap spreads over the past decade.