A microeconomic model of bank demand for borrowed reserves from the Federal Reserve is developed based upon constrained cost minimization. The derived demand function was found to correspond to behavior appropriate to the unknown switchpoint switching regression problem. When estimated, parameters generally conformed to theoretical expectations. The model was also tested for existence of switching regression behavior against a model similar to Goldfeld and Kane [12]. Significance exceeded 99% in all cases. With the advent of reserve intermediate targeting, it appears especially necessary to reinvestigate the behavior determining this important source of reserves.

This paper discusses the pricing of assets in an intertemporal rational‐expectations model when real production and inflation evolve according to first‐order autocorrelated processes. The focus is on the structure of the various intertemporal discount rates (yields) exhibited by this economy. Yield curves are identified for consumption claims, indexed bonds, and nominally riskless bonds and can be extended to any claim that can be approximated by a (finite) linear combination of such securities. The model demonstrates that, if the average term structure for nominally riskless securities is upward sloping, then the yield curve for consumption (market) claims is downward sloping, suggesting that conventional methods for computing long‐term discount rates err by not accounting for maturity factors. The paper also explores the relationship between the intertemporal equilibrium and its embedded single‐period equilibria. The single‐period risk measures in this economy are derived and shown to be (generally) functions of maturity. A model of nominal bond betas is constructed along these lines. It is shown that bond betas that are increasing functions of maturity do not necessarily imply an upward‐sloping term structure.

This paper presents a formal theoretic framework to analyze credit union interest rates on loans and savings deposits. The unique motivational and institutional features of a credit union, in particular its structure as a financial service cooperative, are used to develop the objective function. This is based on a comparison of the credit union's rates to alternatively available market rates and includes parameters to recognize the possibility of borrower-saver conflict. The principal result is that the optimal rates and reactions to exogenous changes depend critically on the preference of the organization toward financial gain to the borrowing and saving members.