Multibeta asset pricing models are examined using proxies for economic state variables in a framework that exploits time-varying expected returns to estimate conditional betas. Examples include multiple consumption-beta models and models where asset returns proxy for the state variables. When the state variables are not specified, the tests indicate two or three time-varying expected risk premiums in the sample of quarterly asset returns. Conditional betas relative to consumption generate less striking evidence against the model than betas relative to asset returns, but both the consumption and the market variables fail to proxy for the state variables.

This paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over‐ and under‐investment incentives associated with risky debt. We show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under‐investment but increases over‐investment, and vice versa. Under symmetric information, the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets (i.e., project financing). Under asymmetric information, the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project's cash flow in the same rate. If this is not possible, the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large. With regard to dividend convenants, we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments. When they are unconditioned, allowing more dividends increases the under‐investment incentive. In contrast, conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over‐investment incentive.

This paper investigates the effects of seniority rules and restrictive dividend convenants on the over- and under-investment incentives associated with risky debt. We show that increasing seniority of new debt decreases the incidence of under-investment but increases over-investment, and vice versa. Under symmetric information, the optimal seniority rule is to give new debtholders first claim on a new project without recourse to existing assets (i.e., project financing). Under asymmetric information, the optimal debt contract requires equating the expected return to new debtholders in the default state to the new project's cash flow in the same rate. If this is not possible, the optimal seniority rule calls for strict subordination of new debt if the expected cash flow in default is small and full seniority if it is large. With regard to dividend convenants, we show that their effect depends on whether or not dividend payments are conditioned on future investments. When they are unconditioned, allowing more dividends increases the under-investment incentive. In contrast, conditional dividends decrease the underinvestment incentive and increase the over-investment incentive.

In this paper, the authors examine the performance of a sample of fifteen U.S.-based internationally diversified mutual funds between 1982 and 1988. Two performance measures are used, the Jensen measure and the positive period weighting measure proposed by Mark Grinblatt and Sheridan Titman. They find no evidence that the funds, either individually or as a whole, provide investors with performance that surpasses that of a broad, international equity index over this sample period.

This study investigates intraday relations between price changes and trading volumes of options and stocks for a sample of firms whose options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange during the first quarter of 1986. After purging the price change series of the effects of bid/ask spreads, multivariate time-series analysis is used to estimate the lead/lag relation between the price changes in the option and stock markets. The results indicate that price changes in the stock market lead the option market by as much as fifteen minutes. The analysis of trading volume indicates that the stock market lead may be even longer.

This paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing. Demand curves for the authors' model's underlying assets (output products) may be downward sloping, in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption. Also, their marginal production (exercise) costs may be increasing. In addition, they allow for multiple products and a productions capacity constraint. These elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims that comprise the production system's value. The authors illustrate their approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products that have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters.

This paper develops a theory of capital structure in an international setting with corporate and personal taxes. We generalize the Miller analysis to an international equilibrium characterized by differential international taxation and inflation in otherwise perfect international capital markets. Our analysis highlights the key role that corporate tax arbitrage plays in generating an international capital structure equilibrium, and we set forth a number of mechanisms for tax arbitrage transactions. We close the paper by outlining some implications of our analysis for national differences in capital structure, the International Fisher Effect, and international tax effects on yield differentials.

This paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing. Demand curves for our model's underlying assets (output products) may be downward sloping, in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption. Also, our marginal production(exercise) costs may be increasing. In addition, we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint. These elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system's value. We illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters.