The authors develop a model of market efficiency assuming private information is partially revealed to uninformed traders via the behavior of those who are informed. This partial revelation of information model is tested in fourteen computerized double auction laboratory markets. It explains the market value and allocation of purchased information, and asset allocations, better than either a fully revealing information model (FRE strong-form efficiency) or a nonrevealing expectations model; but it takes second place to FRE in explaining asset prices. The authors conjecture that refined versions of partial revelation of information may provide insight into "technical analysis" and minibubbles in securities markets.

This paper shows that revealing public information to reduce information asymmetry can reduce a firm's cost of capital by attracting increased demand from large investors due to increased liquidity of its securities. Large firms will disclose more information since they benefit most. Disclosure also reduces the risk-bearing capacity available through market makers. If initial information asymmetry is large, reducing it will increase the current price of the security. However, the maximum current price occurs with some asymmetry of information: further reduction of information asymmetry accentuates the undesirable effects of exit from market making.

Using transaction data on the S&P 100 index options, the authors study the effect of valuation simplifications that are commonplace in previous research on the time-series properties of implied market volatility. Using an American-style algorithm that accounts for the discrete nature of the dividends on the S&P 100 index, they find that spurious negative serial correlation in implied volatility changes is induced by nonsimultaneously observing the option price and the index level. Negative serial correlation is also induced by a bid/ask price effect if a single option is used to estimate implied volatility. In addition, the authors find that these same effects induce spurious (and unreasonable) negative cross-correlations between the changes in call and put implied volatility.

We develop a model of market efficiency assuming private information is partially revealed to uninformed traders via the behavior of those who are informed. This partial revelation of information (PRE) model is tested in fourteen computerized double auction laboratory markets. It explains the market value and allocation of purchased information, and asset allocations, better than either a fully revealing information model (FRE strong‐form efficiency) or a nonrevealing expectations model; but it takes second place to FRE in explaining asset prices. We conjecture that refined versions of PRE may provide insight into “technical analysis” and minibubbles in securities markets.

The authors demonstrate that bids to take firms private generate significantly positive valuation effects for industry rivals of target firms. These valuation effects cannot reflect either synergy or monopoly since no consolidation of operating firms is involved in such transactions. Participation by buyout specialists in the bid does not significantly affect these gains. Bids by outsiders and bids by incumbent managers generate similar valuation effects for industry rivals. The effect on share prices of industry rivals is inversely related to the capitalized values of rival firms relative to the target firm. The authors also report valuation effects for target firms.

This paper examines the risks and returns of long‐term low‐grade bonds for the period 1977–1989. We find: (1) low‐grade bonds realized higher returns than higher‐grade bonds and lower returns than common stocks, and low‐grade bonds exhibited less volatility than higher‐grade bonds due to their call features and high coupons; (2) there is no relation between the age of low‐grade bonds and their realized returns; cyclical factors explain much of the observed relation between default rates and bond age; and (3) low‐grade bonds behave like both bonds and stocks. Despite this complexity there is no evidence that low‐grade bonds are systematically over‐ or under‐priced.

We demonstrate that bids to take firms private generate significantly positive valuation effects for industry rivals of target firms. These valuation effects cannot reflect either synergy or monopoly since no consolidation of operating firms is involved in such transactions. Participation by buyout specialists in the bid does not significantly affect these gains. Bids by outsiders and bids by incumbent managers generate similar valuation effects for industry rivals. The effect on share prices of industry rivals is inversely related to the capitalized values of rival firms relative to the target firm. We also report valuation effects for target firms.

We develop a model of market efficiency assuming private information is partially revealed to uninformed traders via the behavior of those who are informed. This partial revelation of information (PRE) model is tested in fourteen computerized double auction laboratory markets. It explains the market value and allocation of purchased information, and asset allocations, better than either a fully revealing information model (FRE strong-form efficiency) or a nonrevealing expectations model; but it takes second place to FRE in explaining asset prices. We conjecture that refined versions of PRE may provide insight into “technical analysis” and minibubbles in securities markets.