I compare the fees, expenses, and trading costs society pays to invest in the U.S. stock market with an estimate of what would be paid if everyone invested passively. Averaging over 1980–2006, I find investors spend 0.67% of the aggregate value of the market each year searching for superior returns. Society's capitalized cost of price discovery is at least 10% of the current market cap. Under reasonable assumptions, the typical investor would increase his average annual return by 67 basis points over the 1980–2006 period if he switched to a passive market portfolio.

Stock index futures prices are generally below the level predicted by simple arbitrage models. This paper suggests that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted prices is caused by taxes. Capital gains and losses are not taxed until they are realized. As Constantinides demonstrates in a recent paper, this gives stockholders a valuable timing option. If the stock price drops, the investor can pass part of the loss on to the government by selling the stock. On the other hand, if the stock price rises, the investor can postpone the tax by not realizing the gain. Since this option is not available to stock index futures traders, the futures prices will be lower than standard no-tax models predict.

Stock index futures prices are generally below the level predicted by simple arbitrage models. This paper suggests that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted prices is caused by taxes. Capital gains and losses are not taxed until they are realized. As Constantinides demonstrates in a recent paper, this gives stockholders a valuable timing option. If the stock price drops, the investor can pass part of the loss on to the government by selling the stock. On the other hand, if the stock price rises, the investor can postpone the tax by not realizing the gain. Since this option is not available to stock index futures traders, the futures prices will be lower than standard no‐tax models predict.

The aggregate portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio, but the high costs of active management show up intact as lower returns to investors. Bootstrap simulations suggest that few funds produce benchmark‐adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs. If we add back the costs in fund expense ratios, there is evidence of inferior and superior performance (nonzero true α ) in the extreme tails of the cross‐section of mutual fund α estimates.

The anomalous returns associated with net stock issues, accruals, and momentum are pervasive; they show up in all size groups (micro, small, and big) in cross‐section regressions, and they are also strong in sorts, at least in the extremes. The asset growth and profitability anomalies are less robust. There is an asset growth anomaly in average returns on microcaps and small stocks, but it is absent for big stocks. Among profitable firms, higher profitability tends to be associated with abnormally high returns, but there is little evidence that unprofitable firms have unusually low returns.

The book‐to‐market ratio (B/M) is a noisy measure of expected stock returns because it also varies with expected cashflows. Our hypothesis is that the evolution of B/M, in terms of past changes in book equity and price, contains independent information about expected cashflows that can be used to improve estimates of expected returns. The tests support this hypothesis, with results that are largely but not entirely similar for Microcap stocks (below the 20 th NYSE market capitalization percentile) and All but Micro stocks (ABM).

We examine (1) how value premiums vary with firm size, (2) whether the CAPM explains value premiums, and (3) whether, in general, average returns compensate β in the way predicted by the CAPM. Loughran's (1997) evidence for a weak value premium among large firms is special to 1963 to 1995, U.S. stocks, and the book‐to‐market value‐growth indicator. Ang and Chen's (2005) evidence that the CAPM can explain U.S. value premiums is special to 1926 to 1963. The CAPM's more general problem is that variation in β unrelated to size and the value‐growth characteristic goes unrewarded throughout 1926 to 2004.

We estimate the equity premium using dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain. Our estimates for 1951 to 2000, 2.55 percent and 4.32 percent, are much lower than the equity premium produced by the average stock return, 7.43 percent. Our evidence suggests that the high average return for 1951 to 2000 is due to a decline in discount rates that produces a large unexpected capital gain. Our main conclusion is that the average stock return of the last half‐century is a lot higher than expected.