The authors compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies. The evidence indicates that government officials in the United Kingdom underprice initial public offerenings (IPOs) significantly more than their private company counterparts. In Canada and Malaysia, however, the opposite is true. There does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company IPOs. The authors provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns. Their findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries.

We compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies. The evidence indicates that government officials in the United Kingdom underprice IPOs significantly more than their private company counterparts. In Canada and Malaysia, however, the opposite is true. There does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company IPOs. We provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns. Our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries.

ABSTRACT We compare initial offer prices in privatizations to initial prices in public offerings of private companies. The evidence indicates that government officials in the United Kingdom underprice IPOs significantly more than their private company counterparts. In Canada and Malaysia, however, the opposite is true. There does not appear to be a general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced to a greater degree than private company IPOs. We provide additional evidence on the determinants of privatization initial returns. Our findings indicate that initial returns are significantly higher in relatively primitive capital markets and for privatized companies in regulated industries.

The authors study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, they find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, the authors find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.

ABSTRACT We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross‐sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment‐reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.