Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 7, 1990.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 7, 1990.

For generations government regulations and business traditions confined financial activities within national borders. Leaders and borrowers maintained relationships with domestic bankers, who offered little in the way of innovation or advantage. But the abolition of fixed exchange rates, along with hyper-inflation in the 1970s spelled the beginning of the end for this system. By the 1980s the financial game in the UK, Japan and USA was being played ith some important new rules, and by many new players. The old world of relationship banking had given way to financial transactions based upon price and product innovation. Macroeconomic forces and the policies of central bankers have profoundly altered international trade, exchange rates, and the flow of capital around the world. David Meerschwam explains these economic forces, describes the dramatic effects of de-regulation in the major centres of finance, and shows how financial services firms have had to alter their strategies and develop new skills in order to compete.

This paper evaluates alternative methods for classifying individual trades as market buy or market sell orders using intraday trade and quote data. The authors document two potential problems with quote-based methods of trade classification: quotes may be recorded ahead of trades that triggered them, and trades inside the spread are not readily classifiable. These problems are analyzed in the context of the interaction between exchange floor agents. The authors then propose and test relatively simple procedures for improving trade classifications.

The authors demonstrate that bids to take firms private generate significantly positive valuation effects for industry rivals of target firms. These valuation effects cannot reflect either synergy or monopoly since no consolidation of operating firms is involved in such transactions. Participation by buyout specialists in the bid does not significantly affect these gains. Bids by outsiders and bids by incumbent managers generate similar valuation effects for industry rivals. The effect on share prices of industry rivals is inversely related to the capitalized values of rival firms relative to the target firm. The authors also report valuation effects for target firms.

We demonstrate that bids to take firms private generate significantly positive valuation effects for industry rivals of target firms. These valuation effects cannot reflect either synergy or monopoly since no consolidation of operating firms is involved in such transactions. Participation by buyout specialists in the bid does not significantly affect these gains. Bids by outsiders and bids by incumbent managers generate similar valuation effects for industry rivals. The effect on share prices of industry rivals is inversely related to the capitalized values of rival firms relative to the target firm. We also report valuation effects for target firms.

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts of closed-end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment. The theory implies that discounts on various funds move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts are correlated with prices of other securities affected by the same investor sentiment. The evidence supports these predictions. In particular, the authors find that both closed-end funds and small stocks tend to be held by individual investors, and that the discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stocks do well.