This paper examines the efficiency of the legal gambling market for major league baseball. Weak‐form tests of market efficiency within and across odds lines are performed. Surprisingly, the consistently observed favorite‐longshot bias in racetrack betting is shown to exist in reverse for baseball bettors. However, these and other deviations from efficiency are shown to be insufficient to allow for profitable betting strategies when commissions are considered.
Part 1 Why firms merge: recent history of M&A waves M&A personae creative financing - the new techniques corporate control and expansion via M taxation, deregulation and antitrust legislation merger waves - a cyclical dynamic approach. Part 2 Checklist review of the literature: a checklist of causes - why firms merge a checklist of effects - post-acquisition outcomes a checklist of success and failure factors.
This paper examines the efficiency of the legal gambling market for major league baseball. Weak-form tests of market efficiency within and across odds lines are performed. Surprisingly, the consistently observed favorite-longshot bias in racetrack betting is shown to exist in reverse for baseball bettors. However, these and other deviations from efficiency are shown to be insufficient to allow for profitable betting strategies when commissions are considered.
Asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between equity and debt holders can force a distressed but efficient firm to liquidate and may enable a distressed inefficient firm to continue. In the extreme, if it is costless for an inefficient firm to mimic an efficient firm in a debt restructuring, efficient and inefficient firms are equally likely to continue or liquidate. This article shows that Chapter 11 procedures impose costs on inefficient firms that would otherwise mimic efficient firms. This separation induces voluntary filing for bankruptcy by inefficient firms and consequently enables efficient firms to continue when they would otherwise be liquidated.
Asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between equity and debt holders can force a distressed but efficient firm to liquidate and may enable a distressed inefficient firm to continue. In the extreme, if it is costless for an inefficient firm to mimic an efficient firm in a debt restructuring, efficient and inefficient firms are equally likely to continue or liquidate. This article shows that Chapter 11 procedures impose costs on inefficient firms that would otherwise mimic efficient firms. This separation induces voluntary filing for bankruptcy by inefficient firms and consequently enables efficient firms to continue when they would otherwise be liquidated.
Asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between equity and debt holders can force a distressed but efficient firm to liquidate and may enable a distressed inefficient firm to continue. In the extreme, if it is costless for an inefficient firm to mimic an efficient firm in a debt restructuring, efficient and inefficient firms are equally likely to continue or liquidate. This article shows that Chapter 11 procedures impose costs on inefficient firms that would otherwise mimic efficient firms. This separation induces voluntary filing for bankruptcy by inefficient firms and consequently enables efficient firms to continue when they would otherwise be liquidated.
This article shows that some of the wealth gains from financial decisions involving changes in security form occur on predictable ex dates. For a sample of 113 spinoffs during 1964 to 1990, we document an average excess return of 3.0 percent on ex dates, roughly the same magnitude as the average announcement-date return. We conjecture that the spinoff ex-date return arises because the parent and subsidiary stocks attract different investors who prefer to buy the separated shares after the ex date. We also document that, on average, the target shareholders in stock-for-stock mergers earn an excess return of 1.5 percent on merger ex dates.
This article derives testable restrictions on equilibrium asset prices when investors have the option to time the realization of their capital gains and losses for tax purposes. The tax-timing option alters both the magnitude and timing of equity returns relative to those in a tax-free model. The tax-induced restrictions are empirically examined, and the tax rates and preference parameters are estimated. While the tax-free model can be rejected in favor of the tax-based model as the specified alternative, the tax-based model is still unable to adequately explain cross-sectional differences in asset returns.
Consistent with previous research, the authors fail to find a significant correlation between the abnormal returns of their sample firms with international activities and changes in the dollar. They investigate the possibility that this failure is due to mispricing. Lagged changes in the dollar are a significant variable in explaining current abnormal returns of the authors' sample firms, suggesting that misprizing does occur. A simple trading strategy based upon these results generates significant abnormal returns. Corroborating evidence from returns around earnings announcements as well as errors in analysts' forecasts of earnings is also provided.