Optimal dynamic capital structure choice is fundamentally a problem of commitment. In a standard trade‐off setting with shareholder‐debtholder agency conflicts, full commitment counterfactually predicts the firm would rely almost exclusively on debt financing. Conversely, absent commitment a Modigliani‐Miller‐like value irrelevance and policy indeterminacy result holds. Thus, the content of dynamic trade‐off theory must depend on the commitment technology. In this context, collateral is valuable as a low‐cost commitment device. Because ex ante optimal commitments are likely to be suboptimal ex post, observed capital structure dynamics will exhibit hysteresis and depart significantly from standard predictions.

Many individual investors, mutual funds, and institutions trade as if dividends and capital gains are disconnected attributes, not fully appreciating that dividends result in price decreases. Behavioral trading patterns (e.g., the disposition effect) are driven by price changes instead of total returns. Investors rarely reinvest dividends, and trade as if dividends are a separate, stable income stream. Analysts fail to account for the effect of dividends on price, leading to optimistic price forecasts for dividend‐paying stocks. Demand for dividends is systematically higher in periods of low interest rates and poor market performance, leading to lower returns for dividend‐paying stocks.

Examining a shock to the salience of the sustainability of the U.S. mutual fund market, we present causal evidence that investors marketwide value sustainability: being categorized as low sustainability resulted in net outflows of more than $12 billion while being categorized as high sustainability led to net inflows of more than $24 billion. Experimental evidence suggests that sustainability is viewed as positively predicting future performance, but we do not find evidence that high‐sustainability funds outperform low‐sustainability funds. The evidence is consistent with positive affect influencing expectations of sustainable fund performance and nonpecuniary motives influencing investment decisions.

We propose a theoretical measure of income hedging demand and show that it affects asset prices. We focus on the value factor and first demonstrate that our demand estimates are correlated with the actual demands of retail and mutual fund investors. We then show that the aggregate high‐minus‐low (HML) demand predicts HML returns. Exploiting the state‐level variation in income risk, we demonstrate that state‐level hedging demands predict state‐level HML returns. A long‐short portfolio that exploits this hedging‐induced predictability earns an annualized risk‐adjusted return of 6%.

Past studies document that incentive conflicts may lead issuer‐paid credit rating agencies to provide optimistically biased ratings. In this paper, we present evidence that investors question the quality of issuer‐paid ratings and raise corporate bond yields where the issuer‐paid rating is more positive than benchmark investor‐paid ratings. We also find that some firms with favorable issuer‐paid ratings substitute public bonds with borrowings from informed intermediaries to mitigate the “lemons discount” associated with poor quality ratings. Overall, our results suggest that the quality of issuer‐paid ratings has significant effects on borrowing costs and the choice of debt.