This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.

This paper uses a sample of over 25,000 daily warrant prices to empirically investigate potential problems with the commonly used warrant pricing model proposed by F. Black and M. Scholes as an extension of their call option model. One problem seems to be especially important: the constant variance assumption of the dilution adjusted Black-Scholes model appears to cause biases in model prices for almost all warrants and over the entire sample period. The authors show that more accurate price forecasts are obtained with a specific form of the constant elasticity of variance model.

Over March and April 2000, Internet stocks lost 56%, or $700 billion. This sudden collapse has been attributed to an increasing supply of shares from lockup expirations and equity offerings. I show that Internet stocks collapsed in this period regardless of whether their lockups expired. Furthermore, daily Internet stock portfolio returns were almost unaffected by the number or dollar amount of lockup expirations that day, or by the amount of stock offered in IPOs or SEOs. Most of the Internet stock decline is explained by poor marketwide returns, particularly for growth stocks.

Numerous studies document long‐run underperformance by firms following equity offerings. This paper shows that underperformance is very likely to be observed ex‐post in an efficient market. The premise is that more firms issue equity at higher stock prices even though they cannot predict future returns. Ex‐post , issuers seem to time the market because offerings cluster at market peaks. Simulations based on 1973 through 1997 data reveal that when ex‐ante expected abnormal returns are zero, median ex‐post underperformance for equity issuers will be significantly negative in event‐time. Using calendar‐time returns solves the problem.

In this paper, I use institutional corporate bond trade data to estimate transactions costs in the over‐the‐counter bond market. I find average round‐trip trading costs to be about $0.27 per $100 of par value. Trading costs are lower for larger trades. Small institutions pay more to trade than large institutions, all else being equal. Small bond dealers charge more than large ones. I find no evidence that trading costs more for lower‐rated bonds.

A traditional explanation for stock splits is that they increase the number of small shareholders who own the stock. A possible reason for the increase is that the minimum bid‐ask spread is wider after a split and brokers have more incentive to promote a stock. I document a large number of small buy orders following Nasdaq and NYSE/AMEX splits during 1993 to 1994. I also find strong evidence that trading costs increase, and weak evidence that costs of market making decline following splits. This is consistent with splits acting as an incentive to brokers to promote stocks.

The authors examine forty-seven stocks that voluntarily left the American Stock Exchange from 1992 through 1995 and listed on the NASDAQ . They find that both effective and quoted spreads increase by about 100 percent after listing on the NASDAQ. These spread changes are consistent across stocks. In contrast, excess returns are positive when firms announce a switch from the American Stock Exchange to the NASDAQ. The authors are unable to explain this apparent contradiction.

This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.

This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.

This paper tests the tax explanation of the January effect by examining small firm stock returns before the War Revenue Act of 1917. No evidence of a turn-of-the-year effect is found. This paper also extends previous authors' work on the subject to 1918–29. A January effect is found during that period.