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The Impact of Large Portfolio Insurers on Asset Prices.

Journal of Finance 1993 48(5), 1943-55
The authors develop a simple model in which the presence of portfolio insurers in a market of risk-averse traders leads to multiple equilibria for the pricing of financial assets and can cause an increase in volatility, including insurance-induced price drops. They demonstrate, however, that centralized portfolio insurance firms may actually reduce, not increase, volatility even if the existence of these firms increases the total amount of funds under insurance.

Liquidity, Reconstitution, and the Value of u.s. Treasury Strips.

Journal of Finance 1993 48(1), 315-29
An apparent pricing anomaly exists in the market for U.S. Treasury strips: zero-coupon strips created from principal payments typically trade at significantly higher prices than otherwi se identical zero-coupon strips created from coupon payments. In additi on to documenting this phenomenon, this study demonstrates that differences in liquidity and differences in reconstitution characteristics explain much of this price variation.

Ceo Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis.

Journal of Finance 1993 48(2), 425-58
This paper studies senior management compensation policy in seventy-seven publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987. Almost one-third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions. Newly appointed CEOs with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 percent less than the CEOs they replace. In contrast, outside replacement CEOs are typically paid 36 percent more than their predecessors, and are often compensated with stock options. On average, CEO wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts. However, managers' compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors' claims.

Predictable Stock Returns: The Role of Small Sample Bias.

Journal of Finance 1993 48(2), 641-61
Predictive regressions are subject to two small sample biases: the coefficient estimate is biased if the predictor is endogenous and asymptotic standard errors in the case of overlapping periods are biased downward. Both biases work in the direction of making t-ratios too large so that standard inference may indicate predictability even if none is present. Using annual returns since 1872 and monthly returns since 1927, the authors estimate empirical distributions by randomizing residuals in the vector autoregression representation of the variables. The estimated biases are large enough to affect inference in practice and should be accounted for when studying predictability.

Liquidity, Reconstitution, and the Value of U.S. Treasury Strips

Journal of Finance 1993 48(1), 315
An apparent pricing anomaly exists in the market for U.S. Treasury strips: zero-coupon strips created from principal payments typically trade at significantly higher prices than otherwise identical zero-coupon strips created from coupon payments. In addition to documenting this phenomenon, this study demonstrates that differences in liquidity and differences in reconstitution characteristics explain much of this price variation.

CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis

Journal of Finance 1993 48(2), 425-458
This paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987. Almost one‐third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions. Newly appointed CEOs with ties to previous management are typically paid 35% less than the CEOs they replace. In contrast, outside replacement CEOs are typically paid 36% more than their predecessors, and are often compensated with stock options. On average, CEO wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts. However, managers' compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors' claims.

On the Relation between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks

Journal of Finance 1993 open access
We find support for a negative relation between conditional expected monthly return and conditional variance of monthly return, using a GARCH-M model modified by allowing (1) seasonal patterns in volatility, (2) positive and negative innovations to returns having different impacts on conditional volatility, and (3) nominal interest rates to predict conditional variance. Using the modified GARCH-M model, we also show that monthly conditional volatility may not be as persistent as was thought. Positive unanticipated returns appear to result in a downward revision of the conditional volatility whereas negative unanticipated returns result in an upward revision of conditional volatility.