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Cost of Transacting and Expected Returns in the Nasdaq Market.

Journal of Finance 1997 52(5), 2113-27
This article empirically examines the liquidity premium predicted by the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model using NASDAQ data over the 1973-90 period. The results support the model and are much stronger than for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as reported by Nai-Fu Chen and Raymond Kan (1989) and Venkat R. Eleswarapu and Marc R. Reinganum (1993). The author conjectures that the stronger evidence on the NASDAQ is due to the dealers' inside spreads on the NASDAQ being a better proxy for the actual cost of transacting than the quoted spreads on the NYSE, since the NASDAQ dealers do not face competition from limit orders or floor traders.

Cost of Transacting and Expected Returns in the Nasdaq Market

Journal of Finance 1997 52(5), 2113-2127
This article empirically examines the liquidity premium predicted by the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model using Nasdaq data over the 1973–1990 period. The results support the model and are much stronger than for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as reported by Chen and Kan (1989) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) . I conjecture that the stronger evidence on the Nasdaq is due to the dealers' inside spreads on the Nasdaq being a better proxy for the actual cost of transacting than the quoted spreads on the NYSE, since the Nasdaq dealers do not face competition from limit orders or floor traders.

The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings.

Journal of Finance 1997 52(5), 1823-50
Recent studies have documented that firms conducting seasoned equity offerings have inordinately low stock returns during the five years after the offering, following a sharp run-up in the year prior to the offering. This article documents that the operating performance of issuing firms shows substantial improvement prior to the offering but then deteriorates. The multiples at the time of the offering, however, do not reflect an expectation of deteriorating performance. Issuing firms are disproportionately high-growth firms but issuers have much lower subsequent stock returns than nonissuers with the same growth rate.

When It's Not the Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market.

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 683-712
The authors report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where they allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large–unlike in models with risk-neutral, competitive dealers. However, when the authors allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.

When It's Not The Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 683-712
We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk‐neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.

When It's Not the Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 683 open access
We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk-neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.