Robert A. Schwartz, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 25, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association New York, N.Y. December, 28-30, 1969 (May, 1970), pp. 421-423

The authors analyze the rationale for limit order trading. Use of limit orders involves two risks: (1) an adverse information event can trigger an undesirable execution, and (2) favorable news can result in a desirable execution not being obtained. On the other hand, a paucity of limit orders can result in accentuated short-term price fluctuations that compensate a limit order trader. The authors' empirical tests suggest that trading via limit orders dominates trading via market orders for market participants with relatively well-balanced portfolios, and that placing a network of buy and sell limit orders as a pure trading strategy is profitable.

We analyze the rationale for limit order trading. Use of limit orders involves two risks: 1) an adverse information event can trigger an undesirable execution, and 2) favorable news can result in a desirable execution not being obtained. On the other hand, a paucity of limit orders can result in accentuated short-term price fluctuations that compensate a limit order trader. Our empirical tests suggest that trading via limit orders dominates trading via market orders for market participants with relatively well balanced portfolios, and that placing a network of buy and sell limit orders as a pure trading strategy is profitable.

We analyze the rationale for limit order trading. Use of limit orders involves two risks: 1) an adverse information event can trigger an undesirable execution, and 2) favorable news can result in a desirable execution not being obtained. On the other hand, a paucity of limit orders can result in accentuated short‐term price fluctuations that compensate a limit order trader. Our empirical tests suggest that trading via limit orders dominates trading via market orders for market participants with relatively well balanced portfolios, and that placing a network of buy and sell limit orders as a pure trading strategy is profitable.

We infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness. We define trading as more two‐sided (one‐sided) if the correlation between the number of buyer‐ and seller‐initiated trades increases (decreases), and assess changes in sidedness (relative to a control sample) around events that identify trade initiators. Consistent with asymmetric information, trading is more one‐sided before merger news. Consistent with belief heterogeneity, trading is more two‐sided before earnings and macro announcements with greater dispersion in analyst forecasts, and after news with larger announcement surprises. We examine the codeterminacy of sidedness, bid‐ask spread, volatility, number of trades, and order imbalance.