We examine the cross‐sectional variation in the marginal value of corporate cash holdings that arises from differences in corporate financial policy. We begin by providing semi‐quantitative predictions for the value of an extra dollar of cash depending upon the likely use of that dollar, and derive a set of intuitive hypotheses to test empirically. By examining the variation in excess stock returns over the fiscal year, we find that the marginal value of cash declines with larger cash holdings, higher leverage, better access to capital markets, and as firms choose greater cash distribution via dividends rather than repurchases.

This paper examines whether higher order multifactor models, with state variables linked solely to underlying LIBOR‐swap rates, are by themselves capable of explaining and hedging interest rate derivatives, or whether models explicitly exhibiting features such as unspanned stochastic volatility are necessary. Our research shows that swaptions and even swaption straddles can be well hedged with LIBOR bonds alone. We examine the potential benefits of looking outside the LIBOR market for factors that might impact swaption prices without impacting swap rates, and find them to be minor, indicating that the swaption market is well integrated with the LIBOR‐swap market.

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.