The authors analyze a multiperiod model of trading with differentially informed traders, liquidity traders, and a marketmaker. Each informed trader's initial information is a noisy estimate of the long-term value of the asset and the different signals received by informed traders can have a variety of correlation structures. With this setup, informed traders not only compete with each other for trading profits, they also learn about other traders' signals from the observed order flow. The authors' work suggests that the initial correlation among the informed traders' signals has a significant effect on the informed traders' profits and the informativeness of prices.

We study a new class of unconditional and conditional mean-variance spanning tests that exploits the duality between Hansen-Jagannathan bounds (1991) and mean-standard deviation frontiers. The tests are shown to be equivalent to standard spanning tests in population, but we document substantial differences in the small sample performance of alternative tests. Our empirical application examines the diversification benefits from emerging equity markets using an extensive new data set on U.S. and U.K.-traded closed-end funds. We find significant diversification benefits for the U.K. country funds, but not for the U.S. funds. The difference appears to relate to differences in portfolio holdings rather than to the behavior of premiums in the United States versus the United Kingdom.

During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual-to-stock conversions. The authors test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital-impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. They estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress.

We study a new class of unconditional and conditional mean-variance spanning tests that exploits the duality between Hansen-Jagannathan bounds (1991) and mean-standard deviation frontiers. The tests are shown to be equivalent to standard spanning tests in population, but we document substantial differences in the small sample performance of alternative tests. Our empirical application examines the diversification benefits from emerging equity markets using an extensive new data set on U.S. and U.K.-traded closed-end funds. We find significant diversification benefits for the U.K. country funds, but not for the U.S. funds. The difference appears to relate to differences in portfolio holdings rather than to the behavior of premiums in the United States versus the United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT We analyze a multi‐period model of trading with differentially informed traders, liquidity traders, and a market maker. Each informed trader's initial information is a noisy estimate of the long‐term value of the asset, and the different signals received by informed traders can have a variety of correlation structures. With this setup, informed traders not only compete with each other for trading profits, they also learn about other traders' signals from the observed order flow. Our work suggests that the initial correlation among the informed traders' signals has a significant effect on the informed traders' profits and the informativeness of prices.

ABSTRACT We study a new class of unconditional and conditional mean‐variance spanning tests that exploits the duality between Hansen‐Jagannathan bounds (1991) and mean‐standard deviation frontiers. The tests are shown to be equivalent to standard spanning tests in population, but we document substantial differences in the small sample performance of alternative tests. Our empirical application examines the diversification benefits from emerging equity markets using an extensive new data set on U.S. and U.K.‐traded closed‐end funds. We find significant diversification benefits for the U.K. country funds, but not for the U.S. funds. The difference appears to relate to differences in portfolio holdings rather than to the behavior of premiums in the United States versus the United Kingdom.

International Accounting and History, P.Walton Accounting in the Industrialisation of Westem Europe, J Foreman-Peck The History of financial Reporting in Austria, C. Nowotny and E. Gruber The History of Financial Reporting in Belgium, De Ronge, E. Henrion, and C. Vael The History of Financial Reporting in Denmark, M. Christiansen The History of Financial Reporting in Finland, S. Nasi The History of Financial Reporting in France, A. Mikol The History of financial Reporting in Germany, I. D. Schneider The History of Financial Reporting in Italy, L. Took The History of Financial Reporting in the Netherlands, K Camfferman The History of Financial Reporting in Norway, A. Kinserdahl The History of Financial Reporting in Spain, B. G. Inchausti The History of Financial Reporting in Sweden, S.-A. Nilsson The History of Financial Reporting in Switzerland, A.-K Achleitner The History of Financial Reporting in the UK, C. Napier.

During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual-to-stock conversions. We test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital-impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. We estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress.

ABSTRACT During the 1980s, insolvency of individual thrifts and the thrift deposit insurer created severe incentive problems. Lacking cash to close insolvent thrifts, regulators induced nearly $10 billion of private capital to flow into the industry through mutual‐to‐stock conversions. We test a theory of how regulators encouraged capital‐impaired mutual thrifts to convert by permitting them to pay dividends rather than rebuild capital. We estimate the costs of this policy and interpret the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act as requiring regulators to impose restraints on depository institutions parallel to debt covenants that prevent capital distributions by nonfinancial firms experiencing distress.