ABSTRACT In a dual‐currency, flexible exchange rate model, both nominal and real foreign exchange premia depend on investor risk attitudes, consumption parameters, and the stochastic structure of currency and commodity supplies. When supplies are random, their joint correlation structure determines the sign of the premia. If the money supplies are identically distributed, then all foreign exchange premia, regardless of the currency of denomination, are zero. A positive correlation between the value of a country's currency and its nominal interest rate need not indicate real interest rate movements. Relative bond prices can be negatively correlated with the terms of trade.

In a dual-currency, flexible exchange rate model, both nominal and real foreign exchange premia depend on investor risk attitudes, consumption parameters, and the stochastic structure of currency and commodity supplies. When supplies are random, their joint correlation structure determines the sign of the premia. If the money supplies are identically distributed, then all foreign exchange premia, regardless of the currency of denomination, are zero. A positive correlation between the value of a country's currency and its nominal interest rate need not indicate real interest rate movements. Relative bond prices can be negatively correlated with the terms of trade.

In a dual-currency, flexible exchange rate model, both nominal and real foreign exchange premia depend on investor risk attitudes, consumption parameters, and the stochastic structure of currency and commodity supplies. When supplies are random, their joint correlation structure determines the sign of the premia. If the money supplies are identically distributed, then all foreign exchange premia, regardless of the currency of denomination, are zero. A positive correlation between the value of a country's currency and its nominal interest rate need not indicate real interest rate movements. Relative bond prices can be negatively correlated with the terms of trade.

This paper develops a theory of capital structure in an international setting with corporate and personal taxes. We generalize the Miller analysis to an international equilibrium characterized by differential international taxation and inflation in otherwise perfect international capital markets. Our analysis highlights the key role that corporate tax arbitrage plays in generating an international capital structure equilibrium, and we set forth a number of mechanisms for tax arbitrage transactions. We close the paper by outlining some implications of our analysis for national differences in capital structure, the International Fisher Effect, and international tax effects on yield differentials.

This paper develops a theory of capital structure in an international setting with corporate and personal taxes. The authors generalize the analysis of M. M. Miller (1987) to an international equilibrium characterized by differential international taxation and inflation in otherwise perfect international capital markets. The authors' analysis highlights the key role that corporate tax arbitrage plays in generating an international capital structure equilibrium, and they set forth a number of mechanisms for tax arbitrage transactions. They close the paper by outlining some implications of their analysis for national differences in capital structure, the international Fisher effect, and international tax effects on yield differentials.

This study reexamines the earlier finding of Michael J. Alderson and K. C. Chen (1986) that financial markets do not consider excess pension assets in determining share prices and that significant increases in shareholder wealth occur when an overfunded pension plan is terminated. The results document that specific event-time contamination (corporate restructuring announcements) provides the driving force for all the earlier findings.

ABSTRACT This paper develops a theory of capital structure in an international setting with corporate and personal taxes. We generalize the Miller analysis to an international equilibrium characterized by differential international taxation and inflation in otherwise perfect international capital markets. Our analysis highlights the key role that corporate tax arbitrage plays in generating an international capital structure equilibrium, and we set forth a number of mechanisms for tax arbitrage transactions. We close the paper by outlining some implications of our analysis for national differences in capital structure, the International Fisher Effect, and international tax effects on yield differentials.

In a sample of 326 U.S. acquisitions between 1975 and 1987, three types of acquisitions have systematically lower and predominantly negative announcement period returns to bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target, and when its managers performed poorly before the acquisition. These results suggest that managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce bidding firms' values.