This paper studies a nonexpected utility, general equilibrium asset pricing model in which market fundamentals follow a bivariate Markov switching process. The results show that nonexpected utility is capable of exactly matching the means of the risk‐free rate and the risk premium. Asymmetric market fundamentals are capable of generating a negative sample correlation between the risk‐free rate and the risk premium. Moreover, an equilibrium asset pricing model endowed with asymmetric market fundamentals is consistent with all five first and second moments of the risk‐free rate and the risk premium in the U.S. data.

This paper studies a nonexpected utility, general equilibrium asset pricing model in which market fundamentals follow a bivariate Markov switching process. The results show that nonexpected utility is capable of exactly matching the means of the risk-free rate and the risk premium. Asymmetric market fundamentals are capable of generating a negative sample correlation between the risk-free rate and the risk premium. Moreover, an equilibrium asset pricing model endowed with asymmetric market fundamentals is consistent with all five first and second moments of the risk-free rate and the risk premium in the U.S. data.

This paper studies a nonexpected utility, general equilibrium asset pricing model in which market fundamentals follow a bivariate Markov switching process. The results show that nonexpected utility is capable of exactly matching the means of the risk-free rate and the risk premium. Asymmetric market fundamentals are capable of generating a negative sample correlation between the risk-free rate and the risk premium. Moreover an equilibrium asset pricing model endowed with asymmetric market fundamentals is consistent with all five first and second moments of the risk-free rate and the risk premium in the U.S. data.

The acceleration of the U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s suggests a significant advance in technological innovation, making the perceived probability of entering a “new economy” ever increasing. Based on macroeconomic data, we identify a Bayesian investor's belief evolution when facing a possible structural break in the economy. We show that such belief evolution plays a significant role in explaining both the stock market boom and crash during 1998 to 2001. We conclude that a rational investor's uncertainty about the future of the U.S. economy provides an alternative explanation for the late 1990s stock market “bubble.”

The acceleration of the U.S. productivity growth in the late 1990s suggests a significant advance in technological innovation, making the perceived probability of entering a “new economy” ever increasing. Based on macroeconomic data, we identify a Bayesian investor's belief evolution when facing a possible structural break in the economy. We show that such belief evolution plays a significant role in explaining both the stock market boom and crash during 1998 to 2001. We conclude that a rational investor's uncertainty about the future of the U.S. economy provides an alternative explanation for the late 1990s stock market “bubble.”

In this paper, the authors examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option-pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. The authors' principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. They interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceiv es the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.

Does country transparency affect international portfolio investment? We examine this question by constructing new measures of transparency and by making use of a unique microdata set on portfolio holdings of emerging market funds around the world. We distinguish between government and corporate transparency. There is clear evidence that funds systematically invest less in less transparent countries. Moreover, funds have a greater propensity to exit nontransparent countries during crises.

We use the move of Israeli stocks from call auction trading to continuous trading to show that investors have a preference for stocks that trade continuously. When large stocks move from call auction to continuous trading, the small stocks that still trade by call auction experience a significant loss in volume relative to the overall market volume. As small stocks move to continuous trading, they experience an increase in volume and positive abnormal returns because of the associated increase in liquidity. Overall, though, a move to continuous trading increases the volume of large stocks relative to small stocks.

This paper studies the decision of lead investment banks to organize hybrid syndicates (commercial banks participating as co‐managers) versus pure investment bank syndicates. The findings show that hybrid underwriting issues are more challenging to float. Compared to pure investment bank syndicates, hybrid syndicates serve clients that are smaller, have lower common stock rankings and less prior access to the capital markets, rely more on bank loans, and invest less capital but issue larger amounts, which indicates that commercial banks' participation enhances hybrid services. Moreover, lead investment banks tend to invite banks' participation when clients exhibit higher loyalty in reusing their services.

We examine whether portfolios of domestically traded securities can mimic foreign indices so that investment in assets that trade only abroad is not necessary to exhaust the gains from international diversification. We use monthly data from 1976 to 1993 for seven developed and nine emerging markets. Return correlations, mean‐variance spanning, and Sharpe ratio test results provide strong evidence that gains beyond those attainable through home‐made diversification have become statistically and economically insignificant. Finally, we show that the incremental gains from international diversification beyond home‐made diversification portfolios have diminished over time in a way consistent with changes in investment barriers.