Long‐term estimates of expected return on equities are typically derived from U.S. data only. There are reasons to suspect that these estimates are subject to survivorship, as the United States is arguably the most successful capitalist system in the world. We collect a database of capital appreciation indexes for 39 markets going back to the 1920s. For 1921 to 1996, U.S. equities had the highest real return of all countries, at 4.3 percent, versus a median of 0.8 percent for other countries. The high equity premium obtained for U.S. equities appears to be the exception rather than the rule.

The authors explore performance persistence in mutual funds using absolute and relative benchmarks. Their sample, largely free of survivorship bias, indicates that relative risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds persists; however, persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P 500. A profit analysis indicates that poor performance increases the probability of disappearance. A year-by-year decomposition of the persistence effect demonstrates that the relative performance pattern depends upon the time period observed and it is correlated across managers. Consequently, it is due to a common strategy that is not captured by standard stylistic categories or risk adjustment procedures.

Alfred Cowles' test of the Dow Theory apparently provides strong evidence against the ability of Wall Street's most famous chartist to forecast the stock market. Cowles (1934) analyzes editorials published by the chief exponent of the Dow Theory, William Peter Hamilton. We review Cowles' evidence and find that it supports the contrary conclusion. Hamilton's timing strategies actually yield high Sharpe ratios and positive alphas for the period 1902 to 1929. Neural net modeling to replicate Hamilton's market calls provides interesting insight into the Dow Theory and allows us to examine the properties of the theory itself out of sample.

Long‐term estimates of expected return on equities are typically derived from U.S. data only. There are reasons to suspect that these estimates are subject to survivorship, as the United States is arguably the most successful capitalist system in the world. We collect a database of capital appreciation indexes for 39 markets going back to the 1920s. For 1921 to 1996, U.S. equities had the highest real return of all countries, at 4.3 percent, versus a median of 0.8 percent for other countries. The high equity premium obtained for U.S. equities appears to be the exception rather than the rule.

This paper reexamines the ability of dividend yields to predict long‐horizon stock returns. We use the bootstrap methodology, as well as simulations, to examine the distribution of test statistics under the null hypothesis of no forecasting ability. These experiments are constructed so as to maintain the dynamics of regressions with lagged dependent variables over long horizons. We find that the empirically observed statistics are well within the 95% bounds of their simulated distributions. Overall there is no strong statistical evidence indicating that dividend yields can be used to forecast stock returns.

This paper reexamines the ability of dividend yields to predict long-horizon stock returns. The authors use the bootstrap methodology, as well as simulations, to examine the distribution of test statistics under the null hypothesis of no forecasting ability. These experiments are constructed so as to maintain the dynamics of regressions with lagged dependent variables over long horizons. They find that the empirically observed statistics are well within the 95 percent bounds of their simulated distributions. Overall there is no strong statistical evidence indicating that dividend yields can be used to forecast stock returns. Copyright 1993 by American Finance Association.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

We explore performance persistence in mutual funds using absolute and relative benchmarks. Our sample, largely free of survivorship bias, indicates that relative risk‐adjusted performance of mutual funds persists; however, persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P 500. A probit analysis indicates that poor performance increases the probability of disappearance. A year‐by‐year decomposition of the persistence effect demonstrates that the relative performance pattern depends upon the time period observed, and it is correlated across managers. Consequently, it is due to a common strategy that is not captured by standard stylistic categories or risk adjustment procedures.

We explore performance persistence in mutual funds using absolute and relative benchmarks. Our sample, largely free of survivorship bias, indicates that relative risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds persists; however, persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P 500. A probit analysis indicates that poor performance increases the probability of disappearance. A year-by-year decomposition of the persistence effect demonstrates that the relative performance pattern depends upon the time period observed, and it is correlated across managers. Consequently, it is due to a common strategy that is not captured by standard stylistic categories or risk adjustment procedures.