We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on‐the‐wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.

This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter‐end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments to Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases. Funds managing large risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information‐sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry. Confidential holdings exhibit superior performance up to 12 months, and tend to take longer to build. Together the evidence supports private information and the associated price impact as the dominant motives for confidentiality.