Motivating innovation is important in many incentive problems. This paper shows that the optimal innovation‐motivating incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long‐term success. Moreover, commitment to a long‐term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are essential to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal innovation‐motivating incentive scheme can be implemented via a combination of stock options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes, and managerial entrenchment

We aim to tackle the longstanding debate on whether stock liquidity enhances or impedes firm innovation. This topic is of interest because innovation is crucial for firm‐ and national‐level competitiveness and stock liquidity can be altered by financial market regulations. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach that relies on the exogenous variation in liquidity generated by regulatory changes, we find that an increase in liquidity causes a reduction in future innovation. We identify two possible mechanisms through which liquidity impedes innovation: increased exposure to hostile takeovers and higher presence of institutional investors who do not actively gather information or monitor

We examine the asset pricing implications of a production economy whose long‐term growth prospects are endogenously determined by innovation and R&D. In equilibrium, R&D endogenously drives a small, persistent component in productivity that generates long‐run uncertainty about economic growth. With recursive preferences, households fear that persistent downturns in economic growth are accompanied by low asset valuations and command high‐risk premia in asset markets. Empirically, we find substantial evidence for innovation‐driven low‐frequency movements in aggregate growth rates and asset market valuations. In short, equilibrium growth is risky

James C. Van Horne, Of Financial Innovations and Excesses, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 620-631

We investigate how the deterioration of household balance sheets affects worker productivity, and in turn economic downturns. Specifically, we compare the output of innovative workers who experienced differential declines in housing wealth during the financial crisis but were employed at the same firm and lived in the same metropolitan area. We find that, following a negative wealth shock, innovative workers become less productive and generate lower economic value for their firms. The reduction in innovative output is not driven by workers switching to less innovative firms or positions. These effects are more pronounced among workers at greater risk of financial distress

Firms and institutions are monitored and controlled through a complex set of implicit and explicit contractual relations. Because of these agency theoretic relations, institutional behavior in financial markets is not a simple reflection of the preference structures of individuals. Institutional preferences give rise to a demand for new financial instruments and innovations, even when the returns on these instruments are “spanned” in the sense of complete pricing. The innovations can be thought of as solving moral hazard problems. An agency theoretic example serves to illustrate the demand, supply, and financial marketing of stripped securities. In short, institutions matter

Firms and institutions are monitored and controlled through a complex set of implicit and explicit contractual relations. Because of these agency theoretic relations, institutional behavior in financial markets is not a simple reflection of the preference structures of individuals. Institutional preferences give rise to a demand for new financial instruments and innovations, even when the returns on these instruments are “spanned” in the sense of complete pricing. The innovations can be thought of as solving moral hazard problems. An agency theoretic example serves to illustrate the demand, supply, and financial marketing of stripped securities. In short, institutions matter

John Bossons, William F. Sharpe, Jacob B. Michaelsen, William Beranek, Business Finance: Innovations in Analysis: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 21, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New York, New York, December 28-30, 1965 (May, 1966), pp. 245-252

1. Financial Innovation and The Financial System. 2. Securities Innovation: A Historical and Functional Approach. CASES. 1. Financial Engineering and Debt Securities. 1.1 Arbitrage Fundamentals. Cougars. RJRCHC 1991. Arb in Government Bonds. Coca Cola--Harmless Warrants.1.2 Taxes, Regulation and Accounting: Stimuli to Innovation. Citicorp 1985. Note: Eurodollar Bond. New England Property and Casualty. Schroeders Perpetual. Metromedia.1.3 Securitization. Travelers. Note: MBS. Amex TRS Case. Lehman Case.2. Financial Engineering and Equity Securities. 2.1 Addressing Information Asymmetries. Arley. Avon PERCs. GM PERCs. ALZA series (A-B1-B2-C). British Telecom. RJR 1990. Sally Jameson.2.2 Taxes, Regulation and Accounting: Stimuli to Innovation. ARPPS. MMP. Dart and Kraft. Waste Management.3. Managing Issuers' Exposures. 3.1 Managing Issuers' Exposures. B.F. Goodrich-Rabobank. GM--Liab Management. State of CT Muni Swap. Walt Disney. Gaz de France. American Barrick. Enron.3.2 Managing Investors' Exposures. SLH (A&B). Goldman Sachs Nikkel Put Warrants. Commodity Linked Debt. Note: Commodity Futures. Fidelity Case. Diamond Shamrock Natomas. BEA Associates. LOR: Portfolio Insurance. LOR: SuperTrust.FOUNDATION NOTES. Note: U.S. Government Debt Markets. Note: Foreign Exchange. Note: FX Swaps. Note: Introduction to Options. Note: Option Pricing. Note: Contingent Claims Analysis. Note: Financial Futures. Note: Interest Rate Derivatives

Using novel data from the pharmaceutical industry, we study product prices and innovation around mergers. Exploiting within‐deal variation in product market consolidation, we show that prices increase more for drugs in consolidating markets than for matched control drugs. Estimates indicate a 2% average price effect that persists for about one year. Price increases expand with acquirer‐target product similarity and are more pronounced within less competitive product markets with fewer players and no generic competition. Examination of trade‐offs reveals these deals generate significant shareholder value. They also spur labeling and other manufacturing‐related innovation, but not the development of new drugs