We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best-regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry-picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better-regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry-picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better-regulated economy

We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best‐regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry‐picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better‐regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry‐picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better‐regulated economy

This paper is concerned with the problem of price regulation when demand is uncertain. Uncertainty gives rise to substantial difficulties in determining both the return a firm's owners should be provided and a set of prices capable of producing that return. We argue that conventional approaches to price regulation are incapable of attaining the economically desirable objectives of efficiency and an equitable return to investors. The deficiencies in current practices are attributable to the separation of the risk measurement‐return determination and price setting activities in the conventional approach. We present a model of the regulated firm that synthesizes contemporary financial market theory and the theory of the firm under uncertainty. 1 In our approach, the income stream produced by the firm is valued ex ante in the financial market according to investors' perceptions and preferences over riskreturn characteristics. We portray the firm as producing risk and return by choosing among available production technologies to maximize its market value, given the prices set by regulators. Within this framework, it is shown that regulators can choose the lowest prices consistent with an equitable return to investors. We also show that prices so chosen induce the choice of the optimal technology by the firm

Using loan‐level data from Germany, we investigate how the introduction of model‐based capital regulation affected banks' ability to absorb shocks. The objective of this regulation was to enhance financial stability by making capital requirements responsive to asset risk. Our evidence suggests that banks “optimized” model‐based regulation to lower their capital requirements. Banks systematically underreported risk, with underreporting more pronounced for banks with higher gains from it. Moreover, large banks benefitted from the regulation at the expense of smaller banks. Overall, our results suggest that sophisticated rules may have undesired effects if strategic misbehavior is difficult to detect

We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross‐sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions

This paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control. It is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance. Bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk. Utilizing the mean‐variance model, the following results are shown: (a) the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks; (b) as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation, the “theoretically correct” risk weights under the risk‐based capital plan are explicitly derived; and (c) the “theoretically correct” risk weights are restrictions on asset composition, which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms

We use a quasi‐experimental research design to examine the effect of model‐based capital regulation on the procyclicality of bank lending and firms' access to funds. In response to an exogenous shock to credit risk in the German economy, capital charges for loans under model‐based regulation increased by 0.5 percentage points. As a consequence, banks reduced the amount of these loans by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points more than for loans under the traditional approach with fixed capital charges. We find an even stronger effect when we examine aggregate firm borrowing, suggesting that microprudential capital regulation can have sizeable real effects

Homeowners insurance is central to managing the rising losses from climate‐related disasters. We show that insurance premiums are subject to starkly different regulations across states, creating persistent cross‐subsidies and price distortions. We employ states' regulatory rules in an instrumental variable estimation and a border discontinuity design to show insurers do not adjust rates in highly regulated states and compensate by raising rates in less regulated states. Rates and risks diverge in the long run, distorting cross‐state risk‐sharing and increasing insurer exits from highly regulated states. We argue these patterns stem from the interactions between rate regulation and insurers' financing constraints

The basic theoretical relationships between the value of the firm and leverage were set forth by Modigliani and Miller (MM). Much work has tested the MM relationships empirically, including studies which used data from regulated industries. Gordon has stated that, because earnings before interest and taxes are not held constant in regulated industries, the MM formula used in empirical work is invalid. However, Elton-Gruber (EG) challenge Gordon’s statement. The present paper shows that both the Gordon and the EG formulae hold only under special conditions. Under "normal" conditions of demand, both formulae underestimate the value of the levered firm. We show that there is no a priori method of estimating the effect of leverage on the value of a regulated firm without knowledge of specific supply and demand conditions. As researchers do not usually know these conditions, the results of papers testing the MM propositions with data on regulated industries are ambiguous. General formulae for the discount rate and the valuation of a levered firm in a regulated industry are presented

M y assignment is to speak about the regulation of financial futures markets, but in this respect the differences between financial futures and the traditional commodity futures are comparatively minor. Most of what I have to say, therefore, will apply to the regulation of futures markets in general. Towards the end of my remarks I shall say something about the problems that are particular to financial futures