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Boards, CEO entrenchment, and the cost of capital

Journal of Financial Economics 2013 110(3), 680-695
Existing research on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover focuses on CEO ability. This paper argues that board ability is also important. Corporate boards are reluctant to replace CEOs, as this makes financing expensive by sending a negative signal about board ability. Entrenchment in this model does not result from CEO power, or from agency problems. Entrenchment is mitigated when there are more assets-in-place relative to investment opportunities. The paper also compares public and private equity. Private ownership eliminates CEO entrenchment, but market signals improve investment decisions. Finally, the model implies that board choice in publicly listed firms will be conservative.

Failing to forecast rare events

Journal of Financial Economics 2021 142(3), 1001-1016
Do more talented traders prefer to bet on and against rare events or common events? Bets on rare events include out of the money options. Bets against rare events include the carry trade and investment grade bonds. In a model where traders specialize, equilibrium pricing reflects trading ability: A market with more skilled traders has a larger bid ask spread. We show that lower skill traders bet on and against rare events, while higher skill traders bet on and against frequent events, leading to higher bid-ask spreads in common event assets, and reducing financial markets’ ability to predict rare events.

Contractual incompleteness, limited liability and asset price bubbles

Journal of Financial Economics 2015 116(2), 383-409
When should we expect bubbles? Can levered intermediaries bid up risky asset prices through asset substitution? We study an economy with financial intermediaries that issue debt and equity to buy risky assets. Asset substitution alone cannot cause bubbles because it is priced into the intermediaries׳ securities. But incomplete contracts and managerial agency problems can make intermediaries take excessive risk to exploit limited liability, bidding up risky asset prices. This destroys welfare through misallocation of resources. We argue that incentives for private monitoring cannot solve this problem. Finally, even without agency problems, debt subsidies will create similar effects.