We examine the risk characteristics and capital adequacy of hedge funds through the Value-at-Risk approach. Using extensive data on nearly 1,500 hedge funds, we find only 3.7% live and 10.9% dead funds are undercapitalized as of March 2003. Moreover, the undercapitalized funds are relatively small and constitute a tiny fraction of total fund assets in our sample. Cross-sectionally, the variability in fund capitalization is related to size, investment style, age, and management fee. Hedge fund risk and capitalization also display significant time variation. Traditional risk measures like standard deviation or leverage ratios fail to detect these trends.

We test the pecking order model of capital structure by examining the financing of firms that went public in 1983. We estimate a logit to predict external financing, and a multinomial logit to predict the type of financing using data on the IPO firms' security offerings during 1984–1992. Our results indicate that the probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in internally generated funds, although firms with cash surpluses avoid external financing. Firms that access the capital markets do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer.

Corporate customers are an important stakeholder in global supply chains. We employ several unique international databases to test whether socially responsible corporate customers can infuse similar socially responsible business behavior in suppliers. Our findings suggest a unilateral effect on corporate social responsibility (CSR) only from customers to suppliers, an evidence further supported by exogenous variation in customers’ close-call CSR proposals and by product scandals. Customers exert influence on suppliers’ CSR through positive assortative matching and their decision-making process. Enhanced collaborative CSR efforts help improve operational efficiency and firm valuation of both customers and suppliers but increase only the customers’ future sales growth.

This paper studies operational risk in the hedge fund industry using due diligence reports. Many funds suffer from operational problems, including limited disclosure of legal and regulatory issues. We use direct evidence of inadequate or failed internal processes to derive a canonical correlation-based measure for operational risk consistent with the Basel definition. It controls for selection bias using an extension of Heckman's (1979) procedure. Operational risk increases the likelihood of subsequent poor performance and fund disappearance, but does not influence investors’ return-chasing behavior. Our study emphasizes the importance of information verification in the context of financial intermediation.