Market-wide attention-grabbing events — record levels for the Dow and front-page articles about the stock market — predict the trading behavior of investors and, in turn, market returns. Both aggregate and household-level data reveal that high market-wide attention events lead investors to sell their stock holdings dramatically when the level of the stock market is high. Such aggressive selling has a negative impact on market prices, reducing market returns by 19 basis points on days following attention-grabbing events.

This paper provides evidence that portfolio disagreement measured bottom-up from individual-stock analyst forecast dispersions has a number of asset pricing implications. For the market portfolio, market disagreement mean-reverts and is negatively related to ex post expected market return. Contemporaneously, an increase in market disagreement manifests as a drop in discount rate. For book-to-market sorted portfolios, the value premium is stronger among high disagreement stocks. The underperformance by high disagreement stocks is stronger among growth stocks. Growth stocks are more sensitive to variations in disagreement relative to value stocks. These findings are consistent with asset pricing theory incorporating belief dispersion.

Theory predicts that the quality of a firm's information disclosure can affect the term structure of its corporate bond yield spreads. Using cross-sectional regression and Nelson-Siegel yield curve estimation, I find that firms with higher Association for Investment Management and Research disclosure rankings tend to have lower credit spreads. Moreover, this transparency spread is especially large among short-term bonds. These findings are consistent with the theory of discretionary disclosure as well as the incomplete accounting information model of Duffie and Lando (Econometrica 69 (2001) 633). The presence of a sizable short-term transparency spread can attenuate some of the empirical problems associated with structural credit risk models.

A definition of market adjustment is proposed in terms of the time it takes market attributes to reflect new information. Properties of the proposed definition are discussed. In order to operationalize the concept, a statistical method is introduced to estimate the adjustment times. Empirical examples are used to illustrate the proposed method. Some possible economic interpretations are given. The properties of the estimator are also investigated by simulation and analytical methods.

Extremely long odds accompany the chance that spurious-regression bias accounts for investor sentiment׳s observed role in stock-return anomalies. We replace investor sentiment with a simulated persistent series in regressions reported by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), who find higher long-short anomaly profits following high sentiment, due entirely to the short leg. Among 200 million simulated regressors, we find none that support those conclusions as strongly as investor sentiment. The key is consistency across anomalies. Obtaining just the predicted signs for the regression coefficients across the 11 anomalies examined in the above study occurs only once for every 43 simulated regressors.

Does the early-career exposure of bank CEOs to the 1980s savings and loans (S&L) crisis affect the outcomes of banks they subsequently managed? We measure the S&L crisis exposure by the bank failure rate in the states where CEOs worked during the S&L crisis. Armed with this measure, we find that banks managed by CEOs with higher S&L crisis exposure took on less risk and that these banks better survived the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, CEOs adjusted risk attitudes in areas causing the S&L crisis: their more intense crisis experience reduced banks’ interest rate risk, exposure to risky financial innovation and credit risk. We establish the causal interpretation of the findings by evaluating the impact of crisis exposure via CEO hometown states and exploiting quasi-exogenous turnovers due to CEO retirement. Overall, CEOs learned from the past industry crisis which helped curtail their institutions’ risk exposures and enhance later crisis performance.

We find that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without financial covenants—so-called covenant-lite loans—borrowing firms’ revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional financial covenants. This split structure gives revolving lenders the exclusive right and ability to monitor and to renegotiate the financial covenants, and we confirm that loans with split control rights are still subject to the discipline of financial covenants. We provide evidence that split control rights are designed to mitigate bargaining frictions that have arisen with the entry of nonbank lenders and became apparent during the financial crisis.

Past studies typically have focused on whether people perceive more rare risk after experiencing catastrophic disasters. We show that people can also feel less risk with unexpected lucky disaster experience. By exploring a novel identification strategy based on households’ expectations, we find that households perceive less (more) risk when they experience disasters that have lower (higher) fatalities than what was expected. This opposite experience effect of rare disasters is substantial. A one standard deviation increase in the negative (positive) experience shock is associated with a 1.71% decrease (a 1.31% increase) in the life insurance-to-portfolio ratio. We discuss three possible mechanisms to account for our empirical findings: incomplete information learning, salience theory, and change in risk preferences.

We study the determination of liquidity provision in the single-name credit default swap (CDS) market as measured by the number of distinct dealers providing quotes. We find that liquidity is concentrated among large obligors and those near the investment-grade/speculative-grade cutoff. Consistent with endogenous liquidity provision by informed financial institutions, more liquidity is associated with obligors for which there is a greater information flow from the CDS market to the stock market ahead of major credit events. Furthermore, the level of information heterogeneity plays an important role in how liquidity provision responds to transaction demand and how liquidity is priced into the CDS premium.

How do bondholders view the existence of an open market for corporate control? Between 1985 and 1991, 30 states in the U.S. enacted business combination (BC) laws, raising the cost of corporate takeovers. Relying on these exogenous events, we estimate the influence of the market for corporate control on the cost of debt. We identify different channels through which an open market for corporate control can benefit or harm bondholders: a reduction in managerial slack or the “quiet life,” resulting in higher profitability and firm value; a coinsurance effect, in which firms become less risky after being acquired; and an increasing leverage effect, in which bondholder wealth is expropriated through leverage-increasing takeovers. Consistent with the first two mechanisms, we find that the cost of debt rose after the passage of the BC laws; moreover, it rose sharply for firms in non-competitive industries, and for firms rated speculative-grade. In contrast, there is virtually no effect for firms in competitive industries, or firms rated investment-grade.