Knowledge that Transforms

We examine long-run firm performance following open market share repurchase announcements, 1980–1990. We find that the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return measured after the initial announcement is 12.1%. For ‘value’ stocks, companies more likely to be repurchasing shares because of undervaluation, the average abnormal return is 45.3%. For repurchases announced by ‘glamour’ stocks, where undervaluation is less likely to be an important motive, no positive drift in abnormal returns is observed. Thus, at least with respect to value stocks, the market errs in its initial response and appears to ignore much of the information conveyed through repurchase announcements.

Data in this paper support both the inventory-control and asymmetric-information approaches to microstructure theory. Strong evidence of an inventory-control effect on price is new. The transactions dataset chronicles a trading week of a spot foreign exchange dealer whose daily volume averages over $1 billion. In addition to controlling inventory with his own price, the dealer also lays off inventory at other dealers' prices and through brokers. These results highlight the importance of inventory-control theory in understanding trading in this market.

This paper examines shareholder wealth gains from domestic and foreign takeover announcements in the U.S. chemical and retail industries. Contrary to results in several recent papers, these data indicate there is no significant difference in within industry mean takeover premia levels. There is evidence, though, that the sensitivity of takeover premia levels to standard transaction characteristics does differ across buyers: Foreign investors do pay more than domestic investors in hostile transactions, but pay less when there are rival bidders. The results indicate the market's reaction to buyer nationality is closely tied to the transaction's characteristics.

Using a real-options approach to endogenously derive the entire term structure of lease rates, I develop a unified framework for pricing a wide variety of leasing contracts. The structure of the model is analogous to traditional models of the term structure of interest rates. I show how the model is flexible enough to determine equilibrium lease rates for leases of any term and practically any structure, including forward leases, leases with options to renew or cancel, lease insurance contracts, adjustable-rate leases, and leases with payments contingent on asset usage.

This paper examines a recent sample of public workouts for distressed high-yield debt. The nature of holdouts and the effectiveness of coercive tactics in alleviating the holdout problem is analyzed. Tender offers are in relatively less financial distress, exhibit more severe holdouts, and are more coercive than exchange offers. Tender offers also have higher completion rates and fewer Chapter 11 filings. Security prices react positively to announcements of tender offers, negatively to exchange offers. Evidence suggests that coercion is not detrimental to bondholders, and may benefit security holders by increasing the likelihood of a less costly, out-of-court restructuring.

We examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms during top executive turnover in Japanese corporations. Consistent with evidence from U.S. data, the likelihood of nonroutine turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted return on assets, excess stock returns, and negative operating income, but is not related to industry performance. The sensitivity of nonroutine turnover to earnings performance is higher for firms with ties to a main bank than for firms without such ties. Outside succession in Japan is more likely for firms with large shareholders and a main bank relationship. We document performance improvements subsequent to nonroutine turnover and outside succession.

This paper tests for changes in firms' production and pricing decisions in four industries in which firms have sharply increased their financial leverage. The analysis of product price and quantity data shows that industry product market decisions are associated with capital structure. In three industries, output is negatively associated with the average industry debt ratio. In the one industry which shows a positive association between output and debt ratios, rival firms have low financial leverage and entry barriers are relatively low. Analysis of executive compensation data supports the hypothesis that managers' incentives to maximize shareholders' wealth increase following recapitalization.

This paper examines the relation between management turnover and divestitures of recently acquired divisions. The empirical results indicate that at the time of a management change, there is an increased probability of divesting an acquisition at a loss or one considered unprofitable by the press. The probability increases by about the same amount regardless of whether the change is an apparent age-65 retirement or a resignation. Overall, the results are consistent with a variety of agency-based theories of corporate investment and suggest that management changes are important events for corporations because they lead to reversals of poor prior decisions.