Knowledge that Transforms

Information processing filters out the noise in data but it takes time. Hence, low precision signals are available before high precision signals. We analyze how this feature affects asset price informativeness when investors can acquire signals of increasing precision over time about the payoff of an asset. As the cost of low precision signals declines, prices are more likely to reflect these signals before more precise signals become available. This effect can ultimately reduce price informativeness because it reduces the demand for more precise signals (e.g., fundamental analysis). We make additional predictions for trade and price patterns.

Firms strategically choose more conservative capital structures when they face greater competitive threats stemming from the potential loss of their trade secrets to rivals. Following the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine by US state courts, which exogenously increases the protection of a firm's trade secrets by reducing the mobility of its workers who know its secrets to rivals, the firm increases its leverage relative to unaffected rivals. The effect is stronger for firms with a greater risk of losing key employees to rivals, for those facing financially stronger rivals, and for those in industries where competition is more intense.

We show that in the years following a large broad-based employee stock option (BBSO) grant, employee turnover falls at the granting firm. We find evidence consistent with a causal relation by exploiting unexpected changes in the value of unvested options. A large fraction of the reduction in turnover appears to be temporary with turnover increasing in the third year following the year of the adoption of the BBSO plan. The increase three years post-grant is equal in magnitude to the cumulative decrease in turnover over the three prior years, suggesting that long-vesting BBSO plans delay, instead of prevent, turnover.

This paper studies whether director appointments to multiple boards impact firm outcomes. To overcome endogeneity of board appointments, I exploit variation generated by mergers that terminate entire boards and thus shock the appointments of those terminated directors. Reductions of board appointments are associated with higher profitability, market-to-book, and likelihood of directors joining board committees. The performance gains are particularly stark when directors are geographically far from firm headquarters. I conclude that the effect of the shocks to board appointments is: (i) evidence that boards matter; and (ii) plausibly explained by a workload channel: when directors work less elsewhere, their companies benefit.

This paper provides theory and evidence that a low-dimensional term structure model can simultaneously price bonds and related options. It shows that a component of volatility risk largely unrelated to the shape of the yield curve is a determinant of expected excess returns for holding long maturity bonds. It also finds evidence for this return relationship both in the model and directly in the data through regression analysis. The paper also identifies a link between corporate earnings performance and interest rate volatility, providing a channel driving interest rate volatility. The structure of risk in the model that gives rise to these features of volatility is distinct from that inherent in recent models with unspanned stochastic volatility.