Knowledge that Transforms

Underwriters have an incentive to overstate investor interest in order to persuade some investors to purchase shares at a price in excess of their initial estimate of the fair value. We show that this incentive is eliminated when the underwriter commits to secondary market price stabilization. Destroying the underwriter's incentive to overstate interest reduces the total surplus captured by initial investors in initial public offerings. Further efficiency gains are associated with penalty bid systems that permit the underwriter to make the stabilization commitment selectively. Price stabilization can thus be viewed as a bonding mechanism that improves the efficiency of the primary equity market.

This paper is an econometric analysis of the information content of automated orders arriving at the NYSE. The model captures the joint behavior of automated orders and also the return on the stock index future and the futures-spot basis. The results indicate that orders contain information useful in predicting stock returns beyond the information contained in the reported trades. Furthermore, program and index-arbitrage orders contain information beyond that available from the futures return and basis, suggesting that these orders are not merely passive conveyors of common-factor information. Nonprogram, program, and index-arbitrage orders have roughly similar price impacts.

We use when-issued transactions data to assess the Treasury's current experiment with uniform auctions. When-issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions, suggesting a higher information release, which should reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the winner's curse. Under uniform auctions, when-issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information and lower the short squeeze. A direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results.

We examine the relation between exchange rate variability and stock return volatility for U.S. multinational firms and decompose this relation into components of systematic and diversifiable risk. Focusing on two five-year periods around the 1973 switch from fixed to floating exchange rates, we find a significant increase in volatility of monthly stock returns corresponding to the period of increased exchange rate variability, even relative to the increase in stock return volatility for three control samples. In conjunction with this increase in total volatility there is also an increase in market risk (beta) for multinational firms.

I present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective. Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, I find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. The result is robust to numerous controls for company size, industry membership, inside stock ownership, growth opportunities, and alternative corporate governance structures. Companies with small boards also exhibit more favorable values for financial ratios, and provide stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and the threat of dismissal.

We examine the accounting and market performance of reverse leveraged buyouts (i.e., firms making their first public offering after previously completing a leveraged buyout). On average, the accounting performance of these firms is significantly better than their industries at the time of the initial public offering (IPO) and for at least the following four years, though there is some evidence of a decline in performance. Cross-sectional variation in accounting performance subsequent to the IPO is related to changes in the equity ownership of both operating management and other insiders, and is unrelated to changes in leverage. Finally, there is no evidence of abnormal common stock performance after the reverse leveraged buyout.

This paper presents an equilibrium model of the term structure of interest rates when investors have heterogeneous preferences. The basic model considers a pure exchange economy of two classes of investors with different (but constant) relative risk aversion and gives closed-form solutions to bond prices. I use the model to examine the effect of preference heterogeneity on the behavior of bond yields. The model is also extended to cases of more than two classes of investors.

When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? This paper examines empirically the pricing of bank-underwritten securities as compared to investment-house-underwritten securities over a unique period in the U.S. (pre-Glass-Steagall) when both banks and investment houses were allowed to underwrite securities. The evidence shows that investors were willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. The results support a certification role for banks, which is more valuable for junior and information sensitive securities.

We show that there is a negative relation between leverage and future growth at the firm level and, for diversified firms, at the business segment level. This negative relation between leverage and growth holds for firms with low Tobin's q ratio, but not for high-q firms or firms in high-q industries. Therefore, leverage does not reduce growth for firms known to have good investment opportunities, but is negatively related to growth for firms whose growth opportunities are either not recognized by the capital markets or are not sufficiently valuable to overcome the effects of their debt overhang.

We investigate whether investors price the option to abandon a firm at its exit value. Theory prices this real option as an American put with both a stochastic strike price (exit value) and a stochastic value of the underlying security (the value of cash flows). The empirical implications are that firm value increases in exit value, after controlling for expected going-concern cash flows, and that more generalizable assets produce more abandonment option value. Using discounted earnings forecasts to proxy for expected cash flows and prior literature to categorize asset generalizability, we find strong support for the predictions of abandonment option theory.