Knowledge that Transforms

Several studies of mergers and tender offers examine the changes in the value of ownership claims associated with corporate acquisitions and use the observed value changes to address the degree of competition in the market for corporate acquisitions. These studies conclude that the takeover market is competitive on the basis of the abnormal stock price changes of bidding firms, the time series behavior of the market value of target firms, and the proportion of gains that accrue to target and bidding firms. Unfortunately, none of these tests are sufficient to conclude that the takeover market is competitive. A competitive acquisition market implies that the potential gain to unsuccessful bidders at the successful offer price is nonpositive. This implication is tested using data on tender offers in which there are multiple bidders. The results appear to be consistent with competition in the market for corporate acquisitions.

This paper examines the pricing of intermediate-term line commitments, often called revolving credit agreements. Their characteristics, covenant, and compensating balance features are discussed. The fixed portion of the line is described as a dual phased option; it behaves as a put or a call depending on whether bank borrowing is undertaken. Two valuation models, based on the use of the borrowing, are derived for infinitely-lived line commitments. The pattern of borrowing by the firm is shown to principally depend on the relative size of the fixed and variable costs of the line.

The usual assumptions in the continuous-time contingent claims pricing of risky debt are (1) the firm is in default only when the value of its remaining assets falls short of the currently due promised payment and (2) the firm value follows continuous diffusion-process dynamics. It is the joint relaxation of these two simplifying assumptions that motivate this paper in its study of the valuation of risky debt and safety covenants when the firm value follows (possibly) discontinuous sample paths. Explicit solutions are derived and compared to the work of Black and Cox (1976).

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.

The validity of the classic Black-Scholes option pricing formula depends on the capability of investors to follow a dynamic portfolio strategy in the stock that replicates the payoff structure to the option. The critical assumption required for such a strategy to be feasible, is that the underlying stock return dynamics can be described by a stochastic process with a continuous sample path. In this paper, an option pricing formula is derived for the more-general case when the underlying stock returns are generated by a mixture of both continuous and jump processes. The derived formula has most of the attractive features of the original Black-Scholes formula in that it does not depend on investor preferences or knowledge of the expected return on the underlying stock. Moreover, the same analysis applied to the options can be extended to the pricing of corporate liabilities.

This paper examines stock market efficiency with respect to money supply data by testing (1) regression models of stock returns on monetary variables and (2) trading rules based on money supply data. The evidence indicates no meaningful lag in the effect of monetary policy on the stock market and that no profitable security trading rules using past values of the money supply exist. Therefore this evidence is consistent with the efficient market model. Current security returns incorporate all information contained in past money supply data and, in addition, appear to anticipate future changes in the money supply. A number of previous studies have concluded that lags exist and can be used in profitable trading rules. Analysis of these studies demonstrates that for a variety of reasons the evidence in these past studies does not sustain such conclusions.

The fallacy that a many-period expected-utility maximizer should maximize (a) the expected logarithm of portfolio outcomes or (b) the expected average compound return of his portfolio is now understood to rest upon a fallacious use of the Law of Large Numbers. This paper exposes a more subtle fallacy based upon a fallacious use of the Central-Limit Theorem. While the properly normalized product of independent random variables does asymptotically approach a log-normal distribution under proper assumptions, it involves a fallacious manipulation of double limits to infer from this that a maximizer of expected utility after many periods will get a useful approximation to his optimal policy by calculating an efficiency frontier based upon (a) the expected log of wealth outcomes and its variance or (b) the expected average compound return and its variance. Expected utilities calculated from the surrogate log-normal function differ systematically from the correct expected utilities calculated from the true probability distribution. A new concept of ‘initial wealth equivalent’ provides a transitive ordering of portfolios that illuminates commonly held confusions. A non-fallacious application of the log-normal limit and its associated mean-variance efficiency frontier is established for a limit where any fixed horizon period is subdivided into ever more independent sub-intervals. Strong mutual-fund Separation Theorems are then shown to be asymptotically valid.