Using US Department of Justice data on local political corruption, I find that firms in more corrupt areas hold less cash and have greater leverage than firms in less corrupt areas. The results are robust to including a range of controls and to using an instrumental variable approach, two alternative survey measures of corruption, and propensity score matching. Further, the association between corruption and leverage is largest among firms that operate primarily around their headquarters. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that firms manage liquidity downward and debt obligations upward to limit expropriation by corrupt local officials.

Most affine models of the term structure with stochastic volatility predict that the variance of the short rate should play a ‘dual role’ in that it should also equal a linear combination of yields. However, we find that estimation of a standard affine three-factor model results in a variance state variable that, while instrumental in explaining the shape of the yield curve, is essentially unrelated to GARCH estimates of the quadratic variation of the spot rate process or to implied variances from options. We then investigate four-factor affine models. Of the models tested, only the model that exhibits ‘unspanned stochastic volatility’ (USV) generates both realistic short rate volatility estimates and a good cross-sectional fit. Our findings suggest that short rate volatility cannot be extracted from the cross-section of bond prices. In particular, short rate volatility and convexity are only weakly correlated.

This paper examines change in property-liability insurers' risk-taking around enactments of state guaranty fund laws. Our evidence suggests that the risk of insurers' asset portfolios increases following enactments. But this increase in risk is significant only for stock insurers. Our evidence of increased risk-taking following guaranty-fund adoptions suggests that the way these funds are organized creates counterproductive investment incentives, especially for stock companies. Because these laws were enacted by states over the period 1969–1981, our evidence on changes in risk-taking helps resolve statistical problems that have been troublesome for studies of bank deposit insurance.

We examine returns, order flow, and market conditions in the minutes before, during, and after NYSE and Nasdaq short sales. We find two distinct types of short sales: those that provide liquidity, and those that demand it. Liquidity-supplying shorts are strongly contrarian at intraday horizons. They trade when spreads are unusually wide, facing greater adverse selection. Liquidity-demanding shorts trade when spreads are narrow and tend to follow short-term price declines. These results support a competitive rational expectations model where both market-makers and informed traders short, indicating that these two shorting types are integral to both price discovery and liquidity provision.

This paper develops tests of inequality restrictions implied by conditional asset pricing models. The methodology is easy to implement, requires little knowledge of the conditional distribution of asset returns, and is valid under fairly weak assumptions. As an application, we test whether the ex ante risk premium is always positive. We report reliable evidence that the ex ante risk premium is negative in some states of the world; these states are related to periods of high expected inflation and especially to downward-sloping term structures.

We examine the effects of trading and information flows on the short-run behavior of stock prices by comparing the behavior of stock return volatility during trading and nontrading periods. We define nontrading periods as periods when exchanges and businesses are open but traders endogenously choose not to trade. After correcting for the bid/ask bounce and stickiness in quotes, we find that a large proportion of daily stock return volatility occurs without trades, especially for large firms. Furthermore, we provide new evidence that public (versus private) information is the major source of short-term return volatility.

Using a novel data set that covers individual debt claims against 136 bankrupt US companies and includes information on a subset of claims transfers, we provide new empirical insight regarding how a firm’s debt ownership relates to bankruptcy outcomes. Firms with higher debt concentration at the start of the case are more likely to file prearranged bankruptcy plans, to move quickly through the restructuring process, and to emerge successfully as independent going concerns. Moreover, higher ownership concentration within a debt class is associated with higher recovery rates to that class. Trading of claims during bankruptcy concentrates ownership further, but this trading is not associated with subsequent improvements in bankruptcy outcomes and could, at the margin, increase the likelihood of liquidation.

We study debt and equity valuation when investors have private information and may exhibit differences of opinion. Our model generates several predictions that are consistent with empirical evidence but difficult to reconcile with traditional models. Belief dispersion relates to expected equity and debt returns in opposite directions. Similarly, expected debt (equity) returns typically increase (decrease) with default risk, though these relationships reverse for firms close to bankruptcy. Firms’ capital structures affect their valuations even without classical capital structure frictions (e.g., tax shields, distress costs) – when liquidity is higher in the equity than in the debt market, leverage can raise firm value.