Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms, we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship. Tobin's Q first increases, then declines, and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises. For older firms, there is evidence that Q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder.

This paper introduces an event-study method that incorporates the possibility of a random event date. Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume an event may affect not only the conditional mean of a security's return, but also its conditional variance. We compare the statistical power and efficiency of our maximum-likelihood method with the standard application of traditional event-study methods to multiday security returns. Assuming a two-day event period, our empirical results provide evidence that the multiday approach is robust. We use our maximum-likelihood method to investigate the valuation effects of stock splits and stock dividends.

Dual-class exchange offers give stockholders the oppurtunity to exchange common stock for shares with limited voting rights but higher dividends. This paper develops a model to analyze the exchange decision. It shows that exchange offers can induce outside shareholders to exchange their shares for limited voting shares even though the same shareholders, in the same circumstances but acting collectively, would choose not to exchange.

We develop a model of stock-split behavior in which the split serves as a costly signal of managers' private information because stock trading costs depend on stock prices. We present empirical evidence confirming the relation between stock trading costs and stock prices. The signaling model is estimated using a large sample of splits and explains a substantial fraction of the split-announcement returns.