Knowledge that Transforms

We examine long-run firm performance following open market share repurchase announcements, 1980–1990. We find that the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return measured after the initial announcement is 12.1%. For ‘value’ stocks, companies more likely to be repurchasing shares because of undervaluation, the average abnormal return is 45.3%. For repurchases announced by ‘glamour’ stocks, where undervaluation is less likely to be an important motive, no positive drift in abnormal returns is observed. Thus, at least with respect to value stocks, the market errs in its initial response and appears to ignore much of the information conveyed through repurchase announcements.

The tax, employee benefit, capital structure, and corporate control effects of ESOPs are examined by estimating the stock market reaction to ESOP announcements. This is the first empirical examination of the relationship between computed firm-specific tax savings and firm value, and therefore provides evidence that helps resolve the theoretical dispute over ESOP tax savings. The results show that investors expect ESOPs to increase cash flows through tax savings, and to reduce the likelihood of takeover for companies subject to takeover attempts when ESOPs are announced.

Data in this paper support both the inventory-control and asymmetric-information approaches to microstructure theory. Strong evidence of an inventory-control effect on price is new. The transactions dataset chronicles a trading week of a spot foreign exchange dealer whose daily volume averages over $1 billion. In addition to controlling inventory with his own price, the dealer also lays off inventory at other dealers' prices and through brokers. These results highlight the importance of inventory-control theory in understanding trading in this market.

This paper examines shareholder wealth gains from domestic and foreign takeover announcements in the U.S. chemical and retail industries. Contrary to results in several recent papers, these data indicate there is no significant difference in within industry mean takeover premia levels. There is evidence, though, that the sensitivity of takeover premia levels to standard transaction characteristics does differ across buyers: Foreign investors do pay more than domestic investors in hostile transactions, but pay less when there are rival bidders. The results indicate the market's reaction to buyer nationality is closely tied to the transaction's characteristics.

This paper examines the behavior of institutional traders. We use unique data on the equity transactions of 21 institutions of differing investment styles which provide a detailed account of the anatomy of the trading process. The data include information on the number of days needed to fill an order and types of order placement strategies employed. We analyze the motivations for trade, the determinants of trade duration, and the choice of order type. The analysis provides some support for the predictions made by theoretical models, but suggests that these models fail to capture important dimensions of trading behavior.

Using a real-options approach to endogenously derive the entire term structure of lease rates, I develop a unified framework for pricing a wide variety of leasing contracts. The structure of the model is analogous to traditional models of the term structure of interest rates. I show how the model is flexible enough to determine equilibrium lease rates for leases of any term and practically any structure, including forward leases, leases with options to renew or cancel, lease insurance contracts, adjustable-rate leases, and leases with payments contingent on asset usage.

We document that firms making seasoned equity offerings during 1975–1989 substantially underperformed a sample of matched firms from the same industry and of similar size that did not issue equity. This underperformance persists even after controlling for trading system, offer size, and the issuing firm's age and book-to-market ratio. It is similar to that previously documented for initial public offerings, suggesting that managers take advantage of overvaluation in both the initial and seasoned equity offering markets.

This paper examines a recent sample of public workouts for distressed high-yield debt. The nature of holdouts and the effectiveness of coercive tactics in alleviating the holdout problem is analyzed. Tender offers are in relatively less financial distress, exhibit more severe holdouts, and are more coercive than exchange offers. Tender offers also have higher completion rates and fewer Chapter 11 filings. Security prices react positively to announcements of tender offers, negatively to exchange offers. Evidence suggests that coercion is not detrimental to bondholders, and may benefit security holders by increasing the likelihood of a less costly, out-of-court restructuring.