This study uses corporate tax return data to examine the evolution of firms' financial structure and performance after leveraged buyouts (LBOs) for a comprehensive sample of 317 LBOs taking place between 1995 and 2007. We find little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO, although consistent with prior studies, we do observe operating improvements in the set of LBO firms that have public financial statements. We also find that firms do not reduce leverage after LBOs, even if they generate excess cash flow. Our results suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of the LBO structure.

We examine how state antitakeover laws affect bondholders and the cost of debt, and report four findings. First, bonds issued by firms incorporated in takeover-friendly states have significantly higher at-issue yield spreads than bonds issued by firms in states with restrictive antitakeover laws. Second, firms in takeover friendly states have significantly higher leverage than their counterparts in restrictive law states. Third, bond issues are associated with negative average stock price reactions among firms in takeover-friendly states, but positive stock price reactions among firms in restrictive law states. Fourth, existing bond values increase, on average, upon the introduction of Business Combination antitakeover law. These results indicate that state antitakeover laws tend to decrease bond yields and increase bond values, which is the opposite of their effect on equity values. This, in turn, implies that state laws help mitigate the agency cost of debt by shielding bondholders from expropriation in takeovers. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the effect of antitakeover provisions on firm value must take into account the impacts of both bondholders and stockholders.

We examine a sample of 12,023 acquisitions by public firms from 1980 to 2001. The equally weighted abnormal announcement return is 1.1%, but acquiring-firm shareholders lose $25.2 million on average upon announcement. This disparity suggests the existence of a size effect in acquisition announcement returns. The announcement return for acquiring-firm shareholders is roughly two percentage points higher for small acquirers irrespective of the form of financing and whether the acquired firm is public or private. The size effect is robust to firm and deal characteristics, and it is not reversed over time.

The need to understand and measure the determinants of market maker bid/ask spreads is crucial in evaluating the merits of competing market structures and the fairness of market maker rents. This study develops a simple, parsimonious model for the market maker's spread that accounts for the effects of price discreteness induced by minimum tick size, order-processing costs, inventory-holding costs, adverse selection, and competition. The inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components of spread are modeled as an option with a stochastic time to expiration. This inventory-holding premium embedded in the spread represents compensation for the price risk borne by the market maker while the security is held in inventory. The premium is partitioned in such a way that the inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components, as well as the probability of an informed trade, are identified. The model is tested empirically using Nasdaq stocks in three distinct minimum tick size regimes and is shown to perform well both in an absolute sense and relative to competing specifications.

We investigate whether security analysts exhibit persistence in their stock picking ability. We find that analysts whose recommendation revisions earned the most (least) excess returns in the past continue to outperform (underperform) in the future. Further, the market recognizes these performance differences in the five-day period surrounding the recommendation revision. This market reaction, however, is incomplete. Excess returns in the one and three trading months following the revision are significant and positively associated with analysts’ prior performance. However, a trading strategy taking long (short) positions in recommendation upgrades (downgrades) conditional on analysts’ prior performance is unprofitable.

Is climate change partisanship reflected in residential decisions? Comparing individual properties in the same zip code with similar elevation and proximity to the coast, houses exposed to sea level rise (SLR) are increasingly more likely to be owned by Republicans and less likely to be owned by Democrats. We find a partisan residency gap for even moderately SLR exposed properties of more than 5 percentage points, which has more than doubled over the past six years. Findings are unchanged controlling flexibly for other individual demographics and a variety of granular property characteristics, including the value of the home. Residential sorting manifests among owners regardless of occupancy, but not among renters, and is driven by long-run SLR exposure but not current flood risk. Anticipatory sorting on climate change suggests that households that are most likely to vote against climate friendly policies and least likely to adapt may ultimately bear the burden of climate change.

This study provides empirical support for theoretical models that allow for time-varying rare disaster risk. Using a database of 447 international political crises during the period 1918–2006, we create a crisis index that shows substantial variation over time. Changes in this crisis index, our proxy for changes in perceived disaster probability, have a large impact on both the mean and volatility of world stock market returns. Crisis risk is positively correlated with the earnings–price ratio and the dividend yield. Cross-sectional tests also show that crisis risk is priced: Industries that are more crisis risk sensitive yield higher returns.

We present a new approach for positioning, pricing, and hedging in incomplete markets that bridges standard arbitrage pricing and expected utility maximization. Our approach for determining whether an investor should undertake a particular position involves specifying a set of probability measures and associated floors which expected payoffs must exceed in order for the investor to consider the hedged and financed investment to be acceptable. By assuming that the liquid assets are priced so that each portfolio of assets has negative expected return under at least one measure, we derive a counterpart to the first fundamental theorem of asset pricing. We also derive a counterpart to the second fundamental theorem, which leads to unique derivative security pricing and hedging even though markets are incomplete. For products that are not spanned by the liquid assets of the economy, we show how our methodology provides more realistic bid–ask spreads.

A ‘tax-loss selling’ hypothesis has frequently been advanced to explain the ‘January effect’ reported in this issue by Keim. This paper concludes that U.S. tax laws do not unambiguously predict such an effect. Since Australia has similar tax laws but a July–June tax year, the hypothesis predicts a small-firm July premium. Australian returns show pronounced December–January and July–August seasonals, and a premium for the smallest-firm decile of about four percent per month across all months. This contrasts with the U.S. data in which the small-firm premium is concentrated in January. We conclude that the relation between the U.S. tax year and the January seasonal may be more correlation than causation.