Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a new rationale for corporate spin-offs, and for the performance and value improvements following them, based on corporate control considerations. We consider a firm with multiple divisions, with incumbent management having different abilities for managing these divisions. If the incumbent loses control to a more able rival, it benefits all shareholders (including the incumbent) by increasing equity value, but involves the incumbent losing his private benefits of control. We show that a spin-off increases the incumbent's chance of losing control to such a rival. This, in turn, motivates the incumbent either to work harder at managing the firm (in order to avoid any loss of control), or to relinquish control of one of the firms resulting from the spin-off (either immediately following the spin-off, or subsequently in a control contest). We show that spin-offs will be associated with positive announcement effects and increases in long-term operating performance. Further, certain categories of spin-offs will exhibit long-term positive abnormal stock returns.

This paper analyzes the role health status plays in household portfolio decisions using data from the Health and Retirement Study. The results indicate that health is a significant predictor of both the probability of owning different types of financial assets and the share of financial wealth held in each asset category. Households in poor health are less likely to hold risky financial assets, other things (including the level of total wealth) being the same. Poor health is associated with a smaller share of financial wealth held in risky assets and a larger share in safe assets. We find no evidence that the relationship between health status and portfolio allocation is driven by “third variables” that simultaneously affect health and financial decisions. Further, the relationship between health status and portfolio choice does not appear to operate through the effect of poor health on individuals’ attitudes toward risk, their planning horizons, or their health insurance status.

We document a close link between fluctuations in the propensity to pay dividends and catering incentives. First, we use the methodology of Fama and French (J. Finan. Econ. (2001)) to identify a total of four distinct trends in the propensity to pay dividends between 1963 and 2000. Second, we show that each of these trends lines up with a corresponding fluctuation in catering incentives: The propensity to pay increases when a proxy for the stock market dividend premium is positive and decreases when it is negative. The lone disconnect is attributable to Nixon-era controls.

We examine the form, adoption rates, and economic rationale for various mutual fund investment restrictions. A sample of U.S. domestic equity funds from 1994 to 2000 reveals systematic patterns in investment constraints, consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium in the fund industry. Restrictions are more common when (i) boards contain a higher proportion of inside directors, (ii) the portfolio manager is more experienced, (iii) the fund is managed by a team rather than an individual, and (iv) the fund does not belong to a large organizational complex. Low- and high-constraint funds produce similar risk-adjusted returns, also consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium.

Using CRSP stock and mutual fund data, we find strong evidence for reversals at the style level (e.g., large value, small growth, etc.). There are significant excess and risk-adjusted returns for stocks in styles characterized by the worst past returns and net inflows. We also find evidence for momentum and positive feedback trading at the style level. These value and momentum effects are driven neither by fundamental risk nor by stock-level reversals and momentum. Taken together, the results are consistent with the style-level positive feedback trading model of Barberis and Shleifer (2003).

Private information obtained by lenders leads to borrower capture to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders. We analyze how this capture affects the loan portfolio allocation of informed lenders. First, we show that banks charge higher interest rates and finance relatively less creditworthy borrowers in market segments with greater information asymmetries. Second, when faced with greater competition from outside lenders, banks reallocate credit toward more captured borrowers (flight to captivity). Third, if borrower quality and captivity are sufficiently correlated, an increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders can worsen the informed lender's overall loan portfolio. The model explains observed consequences of financial liberalizations.

Our paper re-examines the profitability of relative strength or momentum trading strategies (buying past strong performers and selling past weak performers). We find that standard relative strength strategies require frequent trading in disproportionately high cost securities such that trading costs prevent profitable strategy execution. In the cross-section, we find that those stocks that generate large momentum returns are precisely those stocks with high trading costs. We conclude that the magnitude of the abnormal returns associated with these trading strategies creates an illusion of profit opportunity when, in fact, none exists.

We model the conditional mean and volatility of stock returns as a latent VAR process to study their contemporaneous and intertemporal relationships in a flexible statistical framework and without relying on exogenous predictors. We find a strong and robust negative correlation between the innovations to the conditional moments leading to pronounced countercyclical variation in the Sharpe ratio. We document significant lead-lag correlations between the moments that also appear related to business cycles. Finally, we show that although the conditional correlation between the mean and volatility is negative, the unconditional correlation is positive due to these lead-lag correlations.

We investigate empirically the well-known put–call parity no-arbitrage relation in the presence of short sales restrictions. Violations of put–call parity are asymmetric in the direction of short sales constraints, and their magnitudes are strongly related to the cost and difficulty of short selling. These violations are also related to both the maturity of the option and the level of valuations in the stock market, consistent with a behavioral finance theory of over-optimistic stock investors and market segmentation. Moreover, both the size of put–call parity violations and the cost of short selling are significant predictors of future returns for individual stocks.

Corporate cash flows are highly volatile and strongly procyclical. We examine the asset-pricing implications of the sensitivity of corporate cash flows to economic shocks within a continuous-time model in which dividends are a stochastic fraction of aggregate consumption. We provide closed-form solutions for stock values and show that the equity premium can be represented as the sum of three components which we call the consumption-risk, event-risk, and corporate-risk premia. Calibrated to historical data, the model implies a total equity premium many times larger than in the standard model. The model also generates levels of equity volatility consistent with those experienced in the stock market.