Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s market bubble. We find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Misstatements are also more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, that raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as board chair. Our results indicate that agency costs increased [Jensen, M.C., 2005a, Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] as substantially overvalued equity caused managers to take actions to support the stock price.

The magnitude of mutual funds’ business ties with their portfolio firms is documented and is linked to funds’ proxy votes at specific firms and to overall voting practices. Aggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with management. Votes at specific firms, however, reveal that funds are no more likely to vote with management of client firms than of non-clients. Because the votes took place when funds knew their votes would be publicly scrutinized, fund families with a larger client base may have adopted voting policies that led to less frequent opposition to management at all firms.

NYSE and Nasdaq trades increasingly cluster on multiples of 500, 1,000, and 5,000 shares. Such clustering varies over time and across stocks, and tends to increase with the level of trading activity. Furthermore, rounded trades tend to have more persistence both in occurrence and in trade initiation. Finally, medium-sized rounded trades tend to have greater relative price impact than large rounded trades. From these observations we surmise that trade-size clustering is consistent, at least in part, with the actions of stealth traders who tend to use medium-sized rounded transactions in an attempt to disguise their trades.

We examine how investment banks use initial public offerings (IPOs) in relation to their affiliated mutual funds. The dumping ground hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates cold IPOs to its affiliated funds so that more deals can be completed when demand for these IPOs is weak. Affiliated funds could also receive more cold IPOs because the lead underwriter uses allocations of hot IPOs to unaffiliated funds to gain trading commission business. The nepotism hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates hot IPOs to its affiliated funds to boost their performance and thus attract more money. We find little evidence supporting the dumping ground hypothesis, although some evidence supports the nepotism hypothesis, especially during the internet bubble period of 1999–2000.

Previous studies typically find a statistically insignificant relation between the market risk premium and its expected volatility. Further, several of these studies estimate a negative risk return tradeoff, contrary to the predictions of mainstream theory. Using simulations, I demonstrate that even 100 years of data constitute a small sample that may easily lead to this finding even though the true risk return tradeoff is positive. Small-sample inference is plagued by the fact that conditional volatility has almost no explanatory power for realized returns. Using the nearly two century history of U.S. equity market returns from Schwert [1990. Indexes of United States stock prices from 1802 to 1987. Journal of Business 63, 399–426], I estimate a positive and statistically significant risk return tradeoff. Finally, exploratory analysis suggests a role for a time-varying relation linked to the changing nature of the U.S. economy.

In the 1980s, Drexel Burnham Lambert dominated the underwriting of junk bonds with close to a 50% market share. In 1990, Drexel went bankrupt and was liquidated, and the percentage underwriting fees for junk bonds subsequently dropped dramatically. We present strong evidence that the exit of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the resulting increase in competition for market share were major contributing factors to the decline in junk bond underwriter fees.

Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the subset of monitoring institutions.

Using a robust bootstrap procedure, we find that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck, and hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons. Moreover, we show that Bayesian measures, which help overcome the short-sample problem inherent in hedge fund returns, lead to superior performance predictability. Sorting on Bayesian alphas, relative to OLS alphas, yields a 5.5% per year increase in the alpha of the spread between the top and bottom hedge fund deciles. Our results are robust and relevant to investors as they are neither confined to small funds, nor driven by incubation bias, backfill bias, or serial correlation.

This paper examines the bank lending relations of a large sample of technology and nontechnology firms that went public during the 1996–2000 period. We use a unique hand-collected data set to examine the characteristics of firms that establish pre- Initial Public Offering (IPO) bank lending relations and whether post-IPO performance is related to the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. We find that the majority of IPO firms have banking relations before they go public. Firms with banking relations are older, more profitable or, in the case of tech firms, have lower losses, and are more likely to have funding from venture capitalists than firms without banking relations. We also find that banks lent aggressively to technology firms in the sense that current earnings and cash flows were significantly less important in determining banking relations for technology firms than for nontechnology firms. Consistent with the importance of so-called soft information in lending decisions, we find that, controlling for ex ante observable risk measures, there is a positive and significant relation between improvements in post-IPO operating performance and the existence and size of pre-IPO banking relations. Overall, our results indicate that firms with the best current and future prospects establish banking relations. Our findings provide an explanation as to why investors could interpret lending relations as a positive signal of firm quality.

We create a novel measure of optimism using the Survey of Consumer Finance by comparing self-reported life expectancy to that implied by statistical tables. This measure of optimism correlates with positive beliefs about future economic conditions and with psychometric tests of optimism. Optimism is related to numerous work/life choices: more optimistic people work harder, expect to retire later, are more likely to remarry, invest more in individual stocks, and save more. Interestingly, however, moderate optimists display reasonable financial behavior, whereas extreme optimists display financial habits and behavior that are generally not considered prudent.