Knowledge that Transforms

This paper investigates whether the reputation of acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) is related to the financing structure of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the US between January 1, 1997 and August 15, 2007, we find that reputable PEGs are more active in the LBO market when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards in the credit markets are lax. We also find that reputable PEGs pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer loan maturities, and rely more on institutional loans. In addition, while we find that PEG reputation is positively related to buyout leverage (i.e., LBO debt divided by pre-LBO earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization (EBITDA) of the target), and leverage is significantly positively related to buyout pricing, we do not find any direct relation between PEG reputation and buyout valuations. The evidence suggests that PEG reputation is related to LBO financing structure not only because reputable PEGs are more likely to take advantage of market timing in credit markets and but also because PEG reputation reduces agency costs of LBO debt.

We develop a specification test and a sequence of model selection procedures for non-nested, overlapping, and nested models based on the second Hansen-Jagannathan distance, which requires a good asset pricing model to not only have small pricing errors but also be arbitrage free. Our methods have reasonably good finite sample performances and are more powerful than existing ones in detecting misspecified models with small pricing errors but are not arbitrage-free and in differentiating models that have similar pricing errors of a given set of test assets. Using the Fama and French size and book-to-market portfolios, we reach dramatically different conclusions on model performances based on our approach and existing methods.

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.

In an accelerated seasoned equity offering (SEO), an issuer foregoes the investment bank's marketing efforts in return for a lower fee. To explain why many issuing firms choose a higher cost fully marketed offer, we posit that the marketing effort flattens the issuer's short-run demand curve. Alternatively stated, with a fully marketed offer, the issuer is paying investment bankers to create demand, making the elasticity of demand at the time of issuance an endogenous choice variable. Empirical analysis shows that both the pre-issue elasticity of the issuing firm's demand curve and the offer size are important determinants of the offer method choice. We find evidence of a large transitory increase in the elasticity of demand for issuers conducting fully marketed SEOs.

This paper studies the determinants of the equity premium as implied by producers’ first-order conditions. A simple closed form expression is presented for the Sharpe ratio as a function of investment volatility and technology parameters. Calibrated to the US postwar economy, the model can match the historical first and second moments of the market return and the risk-free interest rate. The model also generates a very volatile Sharpe ratio and market price of risk.

We find evidence of a systematic link between monetary conditions and inter-temporal variation in the price of liquidity. Specifically, following an expansive monetary policy shift, funding conditions improve and market-wide liquidity increases, which is especially beneficial for illiquid securities. The improved liquidity and funding conditions reduce the returns required for holding illiquid securities. Consequently, illiquid stocks experience relatively large price increases when monetary conditions become expansive, and thus, the measured return spread between illiquid and liquid stocks expands substantially. Overall, our evidence supports the claim that the price of asset liquidity is dependent on monetary conditions.

Both a firm's market-timing opportunities and its corporate lifecycle stage exert statistically and economically significant influences on the probability that it conducts a seasoned equity offering (SEO), with the lifecycle effect empirically stronger. Neither effect adequately explains SEO decisions because a near-majority of issuers are not growth firms and the vast majority of firms with high M/B ratios and high recent and poor future stock returns fail to issue stock. Since without the offer proceeds 62.6% of issuers would run out of cash (81.1% would have subnormal cash balances) the year after the SEO, a near-term cash need is the primary SEO motive, with market-timing opportunities and lifecycle stage exerting only ancillary influences.

We investigate contributions of independent directors to shareholder value by examining stock price reactions to sudden deaths in the US from 1994 to 2007. We find, first, that following director death stock prices drop by 0.85% on average. Second, the degree of independence and board structure determine the marginal value of independent directors. Third, independence is more valuable in crucial board functions. Finally, controlling for director-invariant heterogeneity using a fixed effect approach, we identify the value of independence over and above the value of individual skills and competences. Overall, our results suggest that independent directors provide a valuable service to shareholders.