Knowledge that Transforms

We use industry valuation differentials across European countries to study the impact of membership in the European Union as well as the Eurozone on both economic and financial integration. In integrated markets, discount rates and expected growth opportunities should be similar within one industry, irrespective of the country, implying narrowing valuation differentials as countries become more integrated. Our analysis of the 1990–2007 period shows that membership in the EU significantly lowered discount rate and expected earnings growth differentials across countries. In contrast, the adoption of the Euro was not associated with increased integration. Our results do not change when the sample is extended to include the recent crisis period.

The cross-section of stock returns has substantial exposure to risk captured by higher moments in market returns. We estimate these moments from daily S&P 500 index option data. The resulting time series of factors are thus genuinely conditional and forward-looking. Stocks with high sensitivities to innovations in implied market volatility and skewness exhibit low returns on average, whereas those with high sensitivities to innovations in implied market kurtosis exhibit high returns on average. The results on market skewness risk are extremely robust to various permutations of the empirical setup. The estimated premium for bearing market skewness risk is between -6.00% and -8.40% annually. This market skewness risk premium is economically significant and cannot be explained by other common risk factors such as the market excess return or the size, book-to-market, momentum, and market volatility factors. Using ICAPM intuition, the negative price of market skewness risk indicates that it is a state variable that negatively affects the future investment opportunity set.

We find that innovative efficiency (IE), patents or citations scaled by research and development expenditures, is a strong positive predictor of future returns after controlling for firm characteristics and risk. The IE-return relation is associated with the loading on a mispricing factor, and the high Sharpe ratio of the Efficient Minus Inefficient (EMI) portfolio suggests that mispricing plays an important role. Further tests based upon attention and uncertainty proxies suggest that limited attention contributes to the effect. The high weight of the EMI portfolio return in the tangency portfolio suggests that IE captures incremental pricing effects relative to well-known factors.

The 2008 financial crisis exemplifies significant uncertainties in corporate financing conditions. We develop a unified dynamic q-theoretic framework where firms have both a precautionary-savings motive and a market-timing motive for external financing and payout decisions, induced by stochastic financing conditions. The model predicts (1) cuts in investment and payouts in bad times and equity issues in good times even without immediate financing needs; (2) a positive correlation between equity issuance and stock repurchase waves. We show quantitatively that real effects of financing shocks may be substantially smoothed out as a result of firms' adjustments in anticipation of future financial crises.

We administer psychometric tests to senior executives to obtain evidence on their underlying psychological traits and attitudes. We find US CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in terms of their underlying attitudes. In addition, we find that CEOs are significantly more optimistic and risk-tolerant than the lay population. We provide evidence that CEOs' behavioral traits such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are related to corporate financial policies. Further, we provide new empirical evidence that CEO traits such as risk-aversion and time preference are related to their compensation.

We show that acquisitions initiated during periods of high merger activity (“merger waves”) are accompanied by poorer quality of analysts' forecasts, greater uncertainty, and weaker CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. These conditions imply reduced monitoring and lower penalties for initiating inefficient mergers. Therefore, merger waves may foster agency-driven behavior, which, along with managerial herding, could lead to worse mergers. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the average long-term performance of acquisitions initiated during merger waves is significantly worse. We also find that corporate governance of in-wave acquirers is weaker, suggesting that agency problems may be present in merger wave acquisitions.

This article examines the relation between a borrowing firm's ownership structure and its choice of debt source using a novel data set on corporate ownership, control, and debt structures for 9,831 firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010. We find that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant negative impact on the firm's reliance on bank debt financing. In addition, we show that the control-ownership divergence affects other aspects of debt structure including debt maturity and security. Our results indicate that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights may choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from bank monitoring.

We analyze a unique database from a sample of real-world boardrooms — minutes of board meetings and board-committee meetings of eleven business companies for which the Israeli government holds a substantial equity interest. We use these data to evaluate the underlying assumptions and predictions of models of boards of directors. These models generally fall into two categories: “managerial models” that assume boards play a direct role in managing the firm, and “supervisory models” that assume that boards monitor top management but do not make business decisions themselves. Consistent with the supervisory models, our minutes-based data suggest that boards spend most of their time monitoring management: approximately two-thirds of the issues boards discussed were of a supervisory nature, they were presented with only a single option in 99% of the issues discussed, and they disagreed with the CEO only 2.5% of the time. Nevertheless, at times boards do play a managerial role: Boards requested to receive further information or an update for 8% of the issues discussed, and they took an initiative with respect to 8.1% of them. In 63% of the meetings, boards took at least one of these actions or did not vote in line with the CEO. Taken together our results suggest that boards can be characterized as active monitors.

To identify capacity constraints in hedge funds and simultaneously gauge how well-informed hedge fund investors are, we need measures of investor demand that do not affect deployed hedge fund assets. Using new data on investor interest from a secondary market for hedge funds, this paper verifies the existence of capacity constraints in hedge funds. There is more mixed evidence on the information available to hedge fund investors. Buy and sell indications arrive following fund outperformance. While buy indications have little incremental power to predict hedge fund performance over and above well-known forecasting variables, sell indications do somewhat better.

We examine how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation increased at a subset of firms in response to a governance shock that affected compensation levels at other firms in the economy. We first show that Delaware-incorporated firms with staggered boards and no outside blockholders increased CEO compensation following the mid-1990s Delaware legal cases that strengthened their ability to resist hostile takeovers. Consistent with the Gabaix and Landier (2008) contagion hypothesis, non-Delaware firms subsequently increased CEO compensation when the rulings affected a substantial number of firms in their industries. We further show how these legal developments contributed significantly to the rapid increase in CEO compensation in the late 1990s.