Knowledge that Transforms

A discontinuity, or kink, at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution has been interpreted as evidence of managers manipulating returns to avoid showing small losses. Instead, we propose alternative explanations for this phenomenon. In particular, we show that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution. This mechanism accounts for almost the entire kink observed in the large, liquid Long-Short Equity style. Furthermore, we show that asset illiquidity and the bounding of yields at zero can generate distribution discontinuities as well. Therefore, we conclude that the observed hedge fund return discontinuities are not direct proof of manipulation.

Increasing concern over corporate governance has led to calls for more shareholder influence over corporate decisions, but allowing shareholders to vote on more issues may not affect the quality of governance. We should expect instead that, under current rules, shareholder voting will implement the preferences of the majority of large shareholders and management. This is because majority rule offers little incentive for small shareholders to vote. I offer a potential remedy in the form of a new voting rule, the Idealized Electoral College (IEC), modeled on the American Electoral College, that significantly increases the expected impact that a given shareholder has on election. The benefit of the mechanism is that it induces greater turnout, but the cost is that it sometimes assigns a winner that is not preferred by a majority of voters. Therefore, for issues on which management and small shareholders are likely to disagree, the IEC is superior to majority rule.

How do differences of opinion affect asset prices? Do investors earn a risk premium when disagreement arises in the market? Despite their fundamental importance, these questions are among the most controversial issues in finance. In this paper, we use a novel data set that allows us to directly measure the level of disagreement among Wall Street mortgage dealers about prepayment speeds. We examine how disagreement evolves over time and study its effects on expected returns, return volatility, and trading volume in the mortgage-backed security market. We find that increased disagreement is associated with higher expected returns, higher return volatility, and larger trading volume. These results imply that there is a positive risk premium for disagreement in asset prices. We also show that volatility in and of itself does not lead to higher trading volume. Instead, only when disagreement arises in the market is higher uncertainty associated with more trading. Finally, we are able to distinguish empirically between two competing hypotheses regarding how information in markets gets incorporated into asset prices. We find that sophisticated investors appear to update their beliefs through a rational expectations mechanism when disagreement arises.

Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) show that firms with a high probability of default have abnormally low average future returns. We show that firms with a high potential for default (death) also tend to have a relatively high probability of extremely large (jackpot) payoffs. Consistent with an investor preference for skewed, lottery-like payoffs, stocks with high predicted probabilities for jackpot returns earn abnormally low average returns. Stocks with high death or jackpot probabilities have relatively low institutional ownership and the jackpot effect we find is much stronger in stocks with high limits to arbitrage.

We propose a novel time-changed Lévy LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) market model for jointly pricing of caps and swaptions. The time changes are split into three components. The first component allows matching the volatility term structure, the second generates stochastic volatility, and the third accommodates for stochastic skew. The parsimonious model is flexible enough to accommodate the behavior of both caps and swaptions. For the joint estimation we use a comprehensive data set spanning the financial crisis of 2007–2010. We find that, even during this period, neither market is as fragmented as suggested by the previous literature.

During the past decade, non-bank institutional investors are increasingly taking larger roles in the corporate lending than they historically have played. These non-bank institutional lenders typically have higher required rates of return than banks, but invest in the same loan facilities. In a sample of 20,031 leveraged loan facilities originated between 1997 and 2007, facilities including a non-bank institution in their syndicates have higher spreads than otherwise identical bank-only facilities. Contrary to risk-based explanations of this finding, non-bank facilities are priced with premiums relative to bank-only facilities in the same loan package. These non-bank premiums are substantially larger when a hedge or private equity fund is one of the syndicate members. Consistent with the notion that firms are willing to pay a premium when loan facilities are particularly important to them, the non-bank premiums are larger when borrowing firms face financial constraints and when capital is less available from banks.

We propose a measure of dispersion in fund managers׳ beliefs about future stock returns based on their active holdings, i.e., deviations from benchmarks. We find that both the level of and the change in dispersion positively predict subsequent stock returns on a risk-adjusted basis. This effect is particularly pronounced among stocks with high information asymmetry and binding short-sale constraints. These results suggest that a subgroup of informed managers drives up the dispersion in active holdings when they place large bets after receiving positive private information. Binding short-sale constraints, however, prevent them from fully using their negative private information, leading to low dispersion in active holdings.

I examine whether stock ownership by politicians helps to enforce noncontractible quid pro quo relations with firms. The ownership by US Congress members in firms contributing to their election campaigns is higher than in noncontributors. This bias toward contributors depends on the financial incentives of politicians and the relation's value. Firms with a stronger ownership–contribution association receive more government contracts. The financial gains from these contracts are economically large. When politicians divest stocks, firms discontinue contributions to the politicians, lose future contracts, and perform poorly. Politicians divest the stocks in contributors, but not in noncontributors, in anticipation of retirement.

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms׳ acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals.

We propose a simple approach to account for commonalities in mutual fund strategies that relies solely on information on fund returns and investment objectives. Our approach augments commonly used factor models with an additional benchmark that represents an equal investment in all same-category funds, which we call an active peer benchmark (APB). We find that APBs substantially reduce the average time series correlation of residuals between individual funds within a group when added to a four-factor equity model (or to a seven-factor fixed-income model). Importantly, adding this APB significantly improves the selection of funds with future outperformance.