Knowledge that Transforms

This paper develops an optimal trading strategy explicitly linked to an agent׳s preferences and assessment of the distribution of asset returns. The price of this strategy is a portfolio of implied moments, and its expected excess returns naturally accommodate compensation for higher-order moment risk. Variance risk and the equity premium approximate it to first order and it nests cross-sectional asset pricing models such as the linear Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). An empirical study in the US index market compares the investment behavior of an agent with recursive long-run risk preferences to one who merely uses an identically independently distributed time series model and takes market prices as given. The two agents exhibit very similar behavior during crises and can be distinguished mostly during calm periods.

We propose a model to capture the dynamics of asset returns, with periods of crises that are characterized by contagion. In the model, a jump in one region of the world increases the intensity of jumps both in the same region (self-excitation) as well as in other regions (cross-excitation), generating episodes of highly clustered jumps across world markets that mimic the observed features of the data. We develop and implement moment-based estimation and testing procedures for this model. The estimates provide evidence of self-excitation both in the US and the other world markets, and of asymmetric cross-excitation, with the US market typically having more influence on the jump intensity of other markets than the reverse. We propose filtered values of the jump intensities as a measure of market stress and examine their out-of-sample forecasting abilities.

An enduring puzzle is why credit rating agencies (CRAs) use a few categories to describe credit qualities lying in a continuum, even when ratings coarseness reduces welfare. We model a cheap-talk game in which a CRA assigns positive weights to the divergent goals of issuing firms and investors. The CRA wishes to inflate ratings but prefers an unbiased rating to one whose inflation exceeds a threshold. Ratings coarseness arises in equilibrium to preclude excessive rating inflation. We show that competition among CRAs can increase ratings coarseness. We also examine the welfare implications of regulatory initiatives.

The Great Recession illustrates the sensitivity of the economy to housing. This paper shows that financial integration, fostered by securitization and nationwide branching, amplified the positive effect of housing price shocks on the economy during the 1994–2006 period. We exploit variation in credit supply subsidies across local markets from government-sponsored enterprises to measure housing price changes unrelated to fundamentals. Using this instrument, we find that house price shocks spur economic growth. The effect is larger in localities more financially integrated, through both secondary loan market and bank branch networks. Financial integration thus raised the effect of collateral shocks on local economies, increasing economic volatility.

Stock market investment decisions of individuals are positively correlated with those of coworkers. Sorting of unobservably similar individuals to the same workplaces is unlikely to explain this pattern, as evidenced by the investment behavior of individuals who move between plants. Purchases made under stronger coworker purchase activity are not associated with higher returns. Moreover, social interaction appears to drive the purchase of within-industry stocks. Overall, we find a strong influence of coworkers on investment choices, but not an influence that improves the quality of investment decisions.

This paper considers asset pricing models with stochastic differential utility incorporating decision makers׳ concern with ambiguity on true probability measure. Under a representative agent setting, we empirically evaluate alternative preference specifications including a multiple-priors recursive utility. We find that relative risk aversion is estimated around 1–8 with ambiguity aversion and 7.4–15 without ambiguity aversion. Estimated ambiguity aversion is both economically and statistically significant and can explain up to 45% of the average equity premium. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher than one, but its identification appears to be weak, as observed by previous authors.

We study the effects on M&A outcomes of CEO network centrality, which measures the extent and strength of a CEO׳s personal connections. High network centrality can allow CEOs to efficiently gather and control private information, facilitating value-creating acquisition decisions. We show, however, that M&A deals initiated by high-centrality CEOs, in addition to being more frequent, carry greater value losses to both the acquirer and the combined entity than deals initiated by low-centrality CEOs. We also document that high-centrality CEOs are capable of avoiding the discipline of the markets for corporate control and the executive labor market, and that the mitigating effect of internal governance on CEO actions is limited. Our evidence suggests that corporate decisions can be influenced by a CEO׳s position in the social hierarchy, with high-centrality CEOs using their power and influence to increase entrenchment and reap private benefits.

We use a unique data set that contains information on more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be monolithic; instead, our results show that it varies across corporate policies and also varies with the personal characteristics of the CEO. We find that CEOs delegate financial decisions for which they need the most input, when they are overloaded, and when they are distracted by recent acquisitions. CEOs delegate less when they are knowledgeable (long-tenured or with a finance background). Capital is allocated based on “gut feel” and the personal reputation of the manager running a given division. Finally, corporate politics and corporate socialism affect capital allocation in European and Asian firms.

Financing terms and investment decisions are jointly determined. This interdependence, which links firms׳ asset and liability sides, can lead to short-termism in investment. In our model, financing frictions increase with the investment horizon, such that financing for long-term projects is relatively expensive and potentially rationed. In response, firms whose first-best investments are long-term may adopt second-best projects of shorter maturities. This worsens financing terms for firms with shorter-maturity projects, inducing them to change their investments as well. In equilibrium, investment is inefficiently short-term. Equilibrium asset-side adjustments by firms can amplify shocks and, while privately optimal, can be socially undesirable.

We provide evidence that some profitable insider stock selling is motivated by public information. At firms that disclose having concentrated sales relationships, insiders appear to sell their own stock profitably based on public information about their principal customers. Supplier insiders also sell more stock when public information about their customers׳ recent returns and earnings surprises suggests they will earn larger profits. These results are stronger when outside investor attention could be lower. Outside of this setting, insiders engage in a higher proportion of routine sales and their sales are less profitable. We do not find similar patterns for insider purchases.