This paper proposes and develops a novel, simple, widely applicable numerical approach for option pricing based on quadrature methods. Though in some ways similar to lattice or finite-difference schemes, it possesses exceptional accuracy and speed. Discretely monitored options are valued with only one timestep between observations, and nodes can be perfectly placed in relation to discontinuities. Convergence is improved greatly; in the extrapolated scheme, a doubling of points can reduce error by a factor of 256. Complex problems (e.g., fixed-strike lookback discrete barrier options) can be evaluated accurately and orders of magnitude faster than by existing methods.

A ‘tax-loss selling’ hypothesis has frequently been advanced to explain the ‘January effect’ reported in this issue by Keim. This paper concludes that U.S. tax laws do not unambiguously predict such an effect. Since Australia has similar tax laws but a July–June tax year, the hypothesis predicts a small-firm July premium. Australian returns show pronounced December–January and July–August seasonals, and a premium for the smallest-firm decile of about four percent per month across all months. This contrasts with the U.S. data in which the small-firm premium is concentrated in January. We conclude that the relation between the U.S. tax year and the January seasonal may be more correlation than causation.

We develop a theory of how corporate lending and financial intermediation change based on the fundamentals of the firm and its environment. We focus on the interaction between the prospective net worth or liquidity of an industry and the firm’s internal governance or pledgeability. Variations in prospective liquidity can induce changes in the nature, covenants, and quantity of loans that are made, the identity of the lender, and the extent to which the lender is leveraged. We offer predictions on how these might vary over the financial cycle.

Using proprietary institutional trade data, we construct a price impact measure that represents the costs faced by institutional investors. We show that many widely used liquidity measures do not adequately capture institutional trading costs. We then find that institutional trading costs are not dramatically impacted by decimalization, casting doubt on the widely used identification strategy that employs decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity, particularly institutional liquidity. Indeed, we find that conclusions from prior research are significantly altered when we measure liquidity using institutional trading data.

This paper constructs and analyzes various measures of trading costs in US equity markets covering the period 1926–2015. These measures contain statistically and economically significant predictive signals for stock market returns and real economic activity. We decompose illiquidity proxies into a component capturing aggregate volatility and a residual. The predictive content of these components differs in important ways. Specifically, we find strong evidence that the component of illiquidity uncorrelated with volatility forecasts stock market returns. Both the volatility and residual components of illiquidity contain information regarding future economic activity.

We document the frequent use of lockup agreements in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and examine the determinants of their use, duration, and early release. We find that the likelihood of an SEO lockup and its duration are positively related to issuer information asymmetry measures. Lockup duration is negatively related to underwriter spreads and underpricing, indicating that lockups lower expected flotation costs. Lockups are frequently released early following share prices rises. We conclude that lockups represent a contracting solution to asymmetric information and agency problems that plague equity issues by helping to insure SEO quality and deter opportunistic insider trading.

We investigate whether institutional investors “vote with their feet” when dissatisfied with a firm's management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover. However, selling by institutions is far from universal. Overall, there is an increase in shareholdings of individual investors and a decrease in holdings of institutional investors who are more concerned with holding prudent securities, are better informed, or are engaged in momentum trading. Measures of institutional ownership changes are negatively related to the likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO.

The ‘new issues puzzle’ is that stocks of common stock issuers subsequently underperform nonissuers matched on size and book-to-market ratio. With 7000+ seasoned equity and debt issues, we document that issuer underperformance reflects lower systematic risk exposure for issuing firms relative to the matches. A consistent explanation is that, as equity issuers lower leverage, their exposures to unexpected inflation and default risks decrease, thus decreasing their stocks’ expected returns relative to matched firms. Equity issues also significantly increase stock liquidity (turnover), again lowering expected returns relative to nonissuers. We conclude that the ‘new issue puzzle’ is explained by a failure of the matched-firm technique to provide a proper control for risk. This conclusion is robust to issue characteristics and the choice of factor model framework.

This study presents evidence which indicates that stock prices, on average, react positively to stock dividend and stock split announcements that are uncontaminated by other contemporaneous firm-specific announcements. In addition, it documents significantly positive excess returns on and around the ex-dates of stock dividends and splits. Both announcement and ex-date returns were found to be larger for stock dividends than for stock splits. While the announcement returns cannot be explained by forecasts of imminent increases in cash dividends, the paper offers several signalling based explanations for them. These are consistent with a cross-sectional analysis of the announcement period returns.

Using novel credit data, we show that hedge fund borrowing is significantly overcollateralized, primarily with rehypothecable securities. An idiosyncratic liquidity shock to a major prime broker significantly decreases credit to connected hedge funds. The dominant channel behind this shock transmission is credit supply reduction rather than precautionary demand reduction. Funds posting more rehypothecable collateral are less affected because their collateral alleviates prime broker liquidity constraints. Exposed funds subsequently have lower aggregate credit with worse terms, suggesting imperfect substitutability across hedge fund credit sources. Funds subject to the decrease in balance sheet leverage subsequently increase portfolio illiquidity, embedded leverage, and derivatives exposure.