Knowledge that Transforms

The finance industry has grown, financial markets have become more liquid, information technology has been revolutionized. But have financial market prices become more informative? We derive a welfare-based measure of price informativeness: the predicted variation of future cash flows from current market prices. Since 1960, price informativeness has increased at longer horizons (three to five years). The increase is concentrated among firms with greater institutional ownership and share turnover, firms with options trading, and growth firms. Prices have also become a stronger predictor of investment, and investment a stronger predictor of cash flows. These findings suggest increased revelatory price efficiency.

This paper investigates the impact of unconventional monetary policy on firm financial constraints using the maturity extension program (MEP). Consistent with bond market segmentation and limits to arbitrage, around the MEP's announcement, stock prices rose for those firms more dependent on longer-term debt. These firms also issued more long-term debt during the MEP and expanded employment and investment. There is also evidence of “reach for yield” behavior, as the demand for riskier corporate debt also increased. Our results suggest that unconventional monetary policy might have relaxed financial constraints for some firms by inducing gap-filling behavior and affecting bond market risk premia.

In a standard q-theory model, corporate investment is negatively related to the cost of capital. Empirically, we find that the weighted average cost of capital matters for corporate investment. The form of the impact depends on how the cost of equity is measured. When the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used, firms with a high cost of equity invest more. When the implied cost of capital is used, firms with a high cost of equity invest less. The implied cost of capital can better reflect the time-varying required return on capital. The CAPM measure reflects forces that are outside the standard model.

Empirical research has struggled to show that variation in corporate capital structure arises from variation in estimated corporate income tax rates. We argue that, in previous studies, both the tax rates applied to multinational corporations and the taxable income earned have been mismeasured. Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis annual survey sample combined with each firm's income and country specific tax rate, we find that firms do have higher leverage ratios and lower interest coverage ratios when they operate in countries with higher tax rates, as theory would suggest. The trade-off theory of capital structure continues to have empirical support.

I use a sample of closed-end funds to examine how takeover defenses impact shareholder value and promote managerial entrenchment. These funds use the same defenses as general corporations but provide an ideal, homogeneous environment for testing their effects. Defenses are associated with lower fund market values, weaker reactions to activist 13D filings, and higher compensation levels for both fund managers and directors. This study provides greater clarity on the unresolved impact of takeover defenses on firm value, while showing for the first time that directors, who are responsible for adopting takeover defenses, financially benefit from their use.

The existing literature treats the short side (i.e., short selling) and the long side of hedge fund trading (i.e., fund holdings) independently. The two sides, however, complement each other: opposite changes in the two are likely to be driven by information, whereas simultaneous increases (decreases) of the two may be motivated by hedging (unwinding) considerations. We use this intuition to identify informed demand and document that it exhibits highly significant predictive power over returns (approximately 10% per year). We also find that informed demand forecasts future firm fundamentals, suggesting that hedge funds play an important role in information discovery.

We analyze securities trading by banks during the crisis and the associated spillovers to the supply of credit. We use a proprietary data set that has the investments of banks at the security level for 2005–2012 in conjunction with the credit register from Germany. We find that—during the crisis—banks with higher trading expertise (trading banks) increase their investments in securities, especially in those that had a larger price drop, with the strongest impact in low-rated and long-term securities. Moreover, trading banks reduce their credit supply, and the credit crunch is binding at the firm level. All of the effects are more pronounced for trading banks with higher capital levels. Finally, banks use central bank liquidity and government subsidies like public recapitalization and implicit guarantees mainly to support trading of securities. Overall, our results suggest an externality arising from fire sales in securities markets on credit supply via the trading behavior of banks.

We report reduced market response to Friday announcements of dividend changes, seasoned equity offerings, share repurchases, earnings, and mergers, which is seemingly consistent with the notion of investor inattention on Fridays. However, we show that these findings are an outcome of selection bias. Firms that make announcements on Fridays experience reduced market response on any weekday and have common unobserved characteristics across announcement types. After correcting for selection bias, there is no evidence that investors pay less attention to announcements made on Fridays. The method introduced here is applicable to other studies in which an exogenous factor influencing firm performance can actually be associated with firm characteristics.

We examine the performance impact of the relative quality of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s compensation peers (peers to determine a CEO's overall compensation) and bonus peers (peers to determine a CEO's relative-performance-based bonus). We use the fraction of peers with greater managerial ability scores (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay, 2012) than the reporting firm to measure this CEO's relative peer quality (RPQ). We find that firms with higher RPQ earn higher stock returns and experience higher profitability growth than firms with lower RPQ. Learning among peers and the increased incentive to work harder induced by the peer-based tournament contribute to RPQ's performance effect.

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) career and compensation changes for large firms filing for Chapter 11. One-third of the incumbent CEOs maintain executive employment, and these CEOs experience a median compensation change of zero. However, incumbent CEOs leaving the executive labor market suffer a compensation loss with a median present value until age 65 of 7 million (five times pre-departure compensation). The likelihood of leaving decreases with profitability and CEO share ownership. Furthermore, creditor control rights during bankruptcy (through debtor-in-possession financing and large trade credits) are associated with CEO career change. Despite large equity losses (median 11 million for incumbents who stay until filing), the median incumbent does not reduce his stock ownership as the firm approaches bankruptcy.