We use slow and fast time-series momentum to characterize four stock market cycles—Bull, Correction, Bear, and Rebound. The steep market declines of Bears concentrate in high-risk states, yet predict negative expected returns, which is difficult to rationalize by most models of time-varying risk premia. Using a model to analyze slow and fast momentum strategies, we estimate both relatively high mean persistence and realization noise in U.S. stock market returns. Intermediate-speed momentum portfolios, formed by blending slow and fast momentum strategies, translate predictive information in market cycles into positive unconditional alpha, for which we propose a novel decomposition.

Using previously unexplored custodial data, we examine alternative investment vehicles (AVs) in private equity (PE) funds over the last four decades. By 2017, AVs reached 40% of all PE commitments. Average AV performance matches the PE market, but underperforms the main funds of the partnerships sponsoring the AVs. Limited partners (LPs) with better past performance invest in AVs with better average performance, even after conditioning on the general partners’ (GPs’) past records. This result is largely driven by preferential access of top LPs to top AVs. Returns in PE increasingly depend on the match between GPs and LPs and both parties’ outside options.

Identifying the factors that drive the cross-section of expected returns is challenging for at least three reasons. First, the choice of testing approach (time series versus cross-sectional) will deliver different sets of factors. Second, varying test portfolio sorts changes the importance of candidate factors. Finally, given the hundreds of factors that have been proposed, test multiplicity must be dealt with. We propose a new method that makes measured progress in addressing these key challenges. We apply our method in a panel regression setting and shed some light on the puzzling empirical result that the market factor drives the bulk of the variance of stock returns, but is often knocked out in cross-sectional tests. In our setup, the market factor is not eliminated. Further, we bypass arbitrary portfolio sorts and instead execute our tests on individual stocks with no loss in power. Finally, our bootstrap implementation, which allows us to impose the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional explanatory power, naturally controls for the multiple testing problem.

Using data on White House visitors from 2009 through 2015, we find that corporate executives’ meetings with key policymakers are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. We also find evidence suggesting that firms receive more government contracts and are more likely to receive regulatory relief (as measured by the tone of regulatory news) following meetings with federal government officials. Using the 2016 presidential election as a shock to political access, we find that firms with access to the Obama administration experience significantly lower stock returns following the release of the election result than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our results provide evidence suggesting that political access is of significant value to corporations.

Our paper explores the link between cross-sectional fund return dispersion and performance evaluation. The foundation of our model is the simple intuition that in periods of high return dispersion, which is associated with high levels of idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds, unskilled managers can more easily disguise themselves as skilled. Rational investors should be more skeptical and apply larger discounts to reported performance in high dispersion environments. Our empirical results are consistent with this prediction. Using fund flow data, we show that a one standard deviation increase in cross-sectional return dispersion is associated with an 11% to 17% decline in flow-performance sensitivity. The effect is stronger for recent data and among outperforming funds.

Passive institutional investors are an increasingly important component of U.S. stock ownership. To examine whether and by which mechanisms passive investors influence firms' governance, we exploit variation in ownership by passive mutual funds associated with stock assignments to the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. Our findings suggest that passive mutual funds influence firms' governance choices, resulting in more independent directors, removal of takeover defenses, and more equal voting rights. Passive investors appear to exert influence through their large voting blocs, and consistent with the observed governance differences increasing firm value, passive ownership is associated with improvements in firms’ longer-term performance.

The nature of the dependence between discontinuities in prices and contemporaneous discontinuities in volatility (co-jumps) has been reported by many as being elusive, in terms of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance. Using a novel identification strategy in continuous time relying on trade-level information for spot variance estimation, as well as infinitesimal cross-moments, we document that a sizeable proportion of discontinuous changes in prices are associated with strongly anti-correlated, contemporaneous, discontinuous changes in volatility. Assuming a possibly nonmonotonic pricing kernel, we illustrate the equilibrium implications of price and volatility co-jumps for return and variance risk premia.

Although recent research documents a positive relation between corporate transparency and the proportion of independent directors, the direction of causality is unclear. We examine a regulatory shock that substantially increased board independence for some firms, and find that information asymmetry, and to some extent management disclosure and financial intermediation, changed at firms affected by this shock. We also examine whether these effects vary as a function of management entrenchment, information processing costs, and required changes to audit committee independence. Our results suggest that firms can alter their corporate transparency to suit the informational demands of a particular board structure.

In an accelerated seasoned equity offering (SEO), an issuer foregoes the investment bank's marketing efforts in return for a lower fee. To explain why many issuing firms choose a higher cost fully marketed offer, we posit that the marketing effort flattens the issuer's short-run demand curve. Alternatively stated, with a fully marketed offer, the issuer is paying investment bankers to create demand, making the elasticity of demand at the time of issuance an endogenous choice variable. Empirical analysis shows that both the pre-issue elasticity of the issuing firm's demand curve and the offer size are important determinants of the offer method choice. We find evidence of a large transitory increase in the elasticity of demand for issuers conducting fully marketed SEOs.

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.